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Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: 
Is Enforcement Discretion the Answer? 
Clifford Rechtschaffen • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade and more, there has been a sustained attack on 
our nation's approach for regulating environmental, health and safety 
risk. Critics have argued that the current system is inefficient, irrational, 
and overly rigid and have proposed a raft of solutions for improving our 
regulatory approach, most prominently greater reliance on cost-benefit 
analysis. In Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring A Pragmatic Approach, 
Professors Sidney Shapiro and Robert Glicksman offer a strong, coherent 
defense for our current system for environmental, health and safety regu-
lation based on the long-standing philosophical tradition of pragmatism. 
Their book persuasively documents how risk-based statutes enacted by 
Congress reflect a pragmatic accommodation of widely shared social 
values, including those that are not economically quantifiable. For ex-
ample, on the one hand, the book shows how statutes recognize that the 
protection of human life and the environment has a fundamental value 
unrelated to economic measurement and, on the other hand, recognize 
that efficiency matters and that cost should be an important consideration 
in regulatory policy.l 
This symposium explores some of Shapiro and Glicksman's ideas for 
achieving a system of regulation based on pragmatism--one that pro-
vides "the maximum level of protection consistent with reasonable 
COSt.,,2 They argue that in light of bounded rationality facing policy-
makers (the time, resources and cognitive constraints that affect institu-
tional decision making in the real world as opposed to under theoretical 
conditions), it is very difficult for agencies to obtain perfection in their 
initial decisions or to achieve "comprehensive rationality." One alterna-
* Professor & Co-Director, Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Golden Gate University 
School of Law. Thanks to Ash Bhagwat, Helen Kang, Karen Kramer, Dave Markell and Rena 
Steinzor for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to Golden Gate law 
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I. SIDNEY SHAPIRO & ROBERT GUCKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 20-22, 46-47 (2003). 
2. [d. at 147. 
1327 
1328 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
tive approach is to adjust decisions incrementally, at the "back-end" of 
the regulatory process, based on experience and knowledge not available 
when the initial decisions are made.3 Under this approach, regulators 
would adjust general regulatory commitments in light of the specific cir-
cumstances of some regulated entities or the availability of new informa-
tion.4 Professors Shapiro and Glicksman suggest that this approach can 
mitigate the unintended adverse economic and social consequences of 
risk regulation by allowing agencies to accommodate unique or anoma-
lous situations without sacrificing regulatory objectives and by prevent-
ing regulatory standards from causing irrational, inefficient, or unfair 
results in particular cases.5 They recommend several mechanisms for 
making regulatory adjustments, including deadline extensions, waivers, 
negotiated adjustments to regulatory requirements, experimental regula-
tory programs, enforcement discretion, and periodic regulation review.6 . 
A desirable, pragmatic approach recognizes the necessity of adminis-
trative discretion and flexibility.7 But Shapiro and Glicksman recognize 
that too much discretion can threaten the integrity of the policy making 
process or the ability to achieve the goals set by legislation, can water 
down regulatory protections, can create uncertainty for regulators and 
regulated firms, can provide opportunities for favoritism, and can allow 
agencies to make decisions without public participation.8 Back-end ad-
justments can take place in "the shadow of the law" instead of pursuant 
to mandated public processes.9 They contend, however, that these pit-
falls can be minimized by specifying by statute or regulation the criteria 
for making adjustments and by requiring that agencies report on adjust-
ments made, saying agencies "should be required to issue a written ex-
planation of any back-end adjustment decision" that they make.1O More-
over, while there is no way to guard against agency capture, they argue it 
can be minimized by mandating that agencies provide opportunities for 
meaningful public participation in any adjustment process and that the 
avenues for public participation be comparable to the opportunities 
3. Another approach, discussed by others in the symposium, is to provide regulated entities 
with more flexibility in how they comply with risk reduction requirements. Id. at 148. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 158, 171. 
6. Id. at 159. 
7. Id. at 26. 
8. Id. at 170-72. 
9. Id. at 173 (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Crea-
tive Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 297, 319 (1999». 
10. Id. at 174. 
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available when the underlying standards were first adopted. I I Addition-
ally, back-end adjustments should be judicially reviewable. 12 
The specific question addressed by this Article is to what extent one 
of the various mechanisms proffered as a potential vehicle for making 
back-end adjustments-namely, the use of enforcement discretion-is 
well suited to achieving the authors' goals. In short, is it a viable and 
effective tool for mitigating either unintended or unwise consequences of 
regulatory policy? The authors provide little discussion about how they 
envision this particular technique would be used to achieve back-end 
adjustment, but they cite as examples the refusal by an agency to enforce 
de minimis or technical violations and EPA's Supplemental Environ-
mental Project (SEP) policy, in which regulated entities that have vio-
lated the law can avoid paying fines by undertaking environmentally 
beneficial projects. 13 EPA's SEP policy is one for which there is no 
statutory authorization; the EPA developed it as part of its own efforts to 
improve enforcement policy. 
This Article analyzes these questions largely in the context of envi-
ronmental regulation. The focus is on the process of back-end enforce-
ment adjustments; I do not explore fully the substantive standards on 
which such adjustments should be based. Part II discusses how enforce-
ment discretion is used in the current system. Part ill analyzes whether it 
is desirable to give agencies more enforcement discretion in order to ac-
complish back-end adjustments. Part IV examines the role that judicial 
review and increased public participation could play in minimizing the 
possible pitfalls of enhanced enforcement discretion. 
II. OVERVIEW OF USE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION IN THE CURRENT 
SYSTEM 
In attempting to answer whether it is desirable to rely on enforce-
ment discretion as a tool for achieving back-end adjustments, it is useful 
first to assess the realities of current environmental enforcement 
schemes. Specifically, it is helpful to examine the degree to which there 
is currently discretion in environmental enforcement, whether such dis-
cretion is currently being used to achieve back-end adjustments, and if 
so, what lessons can be drawn from this experience. 
11. [d. at 175. 
12. [d. at 176. 
13. /d. at 167--68. 
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A. How Environmental Enforcement Is Currently Applied in Practice 
As a starting point, it is helpful to take a step back and ask how most 
regulatory enforcement is actually applied. Discussion in academic and 
other circles often contrasts two theoretical enforcement approaches-
one based on "deterrence" and the other based on "cooperation." While 
these distinctions are significant and influence the enforcement policies 
of states and the federal government, it is also true that in practice, most 
environmental enforcement systems are a pragmatic combination of the 
two approaches. This is true to an even greater extent now as a result of 
recent reforms adopted by the EPA. 
Numerous studies of agency enforcement demonstrate that most en-
forcers use a flexible, hybrid strategy that includes elements of both co-
ercion and cooperation; few rigidly adhere to legalistic procedures. 
Agencies resolve most violations through informal means and negotia-
tions to bring violators back into compliance. 14 Most instances of non-
compliance are met with either no sanctions or only very minor, informal 
ones. 15 For example, the EPA's 1990 study of its hazardous waste man-
agement program noted that of the approximately 5,700 Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) enforcement actions conducted in 
three different areas, approximately 70 percent were informal, using 
tools such as warning letters and notices of violation. 16 
Moreover, enforcement personnel use a range of tools and strategies, 
depending on the circumstances they encounter. In their extensive study 
14. See Paul B. Downing & James N. Kimball, Enforcing Pollution Control Laws in the U.S., 
II POL'y STUDIES 1. 55, 59-60 (1997) (summarizing numerous studies). 
15. CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 25,37-42 (l986). 
16. U.S. EPA, NATION'S HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS: 
THE RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY (July I 990). One study of Clean Water Act enforcement 
found that 70 percent of actions were at the three lowest levels of enforcement (level (O), no action 
warranted, comment, pennit modification request; level (I), telephone calls, meetings, enforcement 
notice letters; and level (2), warning letters, notices of violations, etc.). SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD 
W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAw: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 53-57, 72-73 
(I 996}. Another study of Clean Water Act enforcement in EPA Region II showed that "the single 
most common agency response to [violations of effluent limits] is to take no formal action against 
[facilities]" (agency took no formal action in 40 percent of cases, and issued waming letters in an-
other 40 percent of cases). PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PuBLIC REGULATION OF 
PRIVATE POLLUTION 278-79 (1991). Another review found that over 80 percent of wetlands viola-
tions over a five year period were resolved by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers without the imposi-
tion of any penalty, while over a three year period, over 90 percent of wetlands violations were re-
solved by EPA without any penalty imposed (two-thirds without formal enforcement action). 
Richard G. Kozlowksi & Howard Bleichfeld, Wetlands Enforcement: Uon or Lamb?, NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 62 (Winter I 996). The EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers have joint en-
forcement authority over wetlands violations. 
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of Clean Water Act (CW A) enforcement, for example, Professors Susan 
Hunter and Richard Waterman found a "pragmatic" EPA enforcement 
process in which agency staff was flexible and employed considerable 
discretion, and in which they utilized a wide range of diverse enforce-
ment mechanisms (including phone calls, conferences, warning letters, 
notices of violation, administrative orders and civil penalties).17 They 
note that pragmatic enforcement was not an explicit goal of enforcement 
staff but was a "natural response to the diversity of the surface-water 
regulatory environment" (such as differences in the nature of water pol-
lution problems, and political, economic, and demographic factors) that 
led to broad variations in the manner in which the CW A is enforced 
across EPA's regional offices and in the fifty states. IS 
Another example of enforcement adaptability is illustrated by a study 
of how regional offices enforced the federal Surface Mining Reclamation 
Control Act (SMRCA) in the late 1970s. The study found noticeable 
differences in style: in the eastern regional offices, a program of "vigor-
ous, rule-oriented enforcement" took shape,19 while in western offices, a 
more flexible, conciliatory orientation developed.2o These differences 
were, in considerable part, a response to the disparate political and regu-
latory environments in the regions. The eastern region developed a 
tougher approach because of the prior recalcitrant attitude of many east-
ern coal miners, the history of ineffective state regulation, the greater 
anticipated resistance by regulated firms, and the concerns about agency 
corruption.21 In the West, there was more consensus about the need for 
mining regulation (including among the mining community), more of a 
history of prior regulation, and less of a perceived need to be visibly 
tough in enforcement.22 
In their recent case study of compliance among pulp and paper mills 
in several countries, Professors Kagan, Gunningham, and Thorton found 
a pragmatic approach to both standard setting and enforcement.23 They 
17. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 16, at 50--65; see also RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 
15, at 65 (stating that most regulators allow for discretion in dealing with short-term permit viola-
tions). 
18. HUNTER&WATERMAN,supranote 16,at50,63-65,l00,124,195. 
19. Neil Shover, et al., Regional Variation in Regulatory Law Enforcement: The Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, in ENFORCING REGULATION 121, 131 (Keith Hawkins & 
John M. Thomas, eds., 1984). 
20. [d. at 132-33. 
21. [d. at 133-37. 
22. [d. 
23. Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunningham, & Dorothy Thorton, Explaining Environmental Per-
formance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 51, 65 (2003). 
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noted that "regulators tailor facility-level permits and informal orders to 
individual mills' inputs, technologies, surrounding environmental exi-
gencies, and investment cycles (e.g., delaying stricter permit require-
ments for old facilities until a scheduled upgrade of its production proc-
esses).,,24 They concluded: 
Far from inflicting a technology-forcing, one-size-fits-all set of regula-
tory requirements on all regulated firms, as critics of regulation often 
suggest, a close examination of the permits of pulp mills reflects a gov-
ernmental propensity, in all jurisdictions we studied, to tailor require-
ments to the technological and economic constraints of particular regu-
lated entities.25 
The EPA has moved toward more explicitly articulating a pragmatic 
enforcement approach at a formal policy level as well. During the 1990s, . 
it began placing greater emphasis on compliance assistance and compli-
ance incentive methods and on integrating these tools with traditional 
enforcement methods.z6 Thus, the EPA began actively implementing 
compliance assistance programs in the rnid-1990s, developing ten com-
pliance assistance centers and thirty sector notebooks, and expanding 
compliance assistance tools such as hotlines, workshops, on-site visits, 
audit protocols, and checklists.27 It also adopted several policies to en-
courage self-policing activities by regulated entities, including a policy 
that provides incentives for voluntary environmental audits28 and a policy 
to encourage compliance among small businesses.29 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 84. 
26. Environmental Regulation, State Innovative Compliance Strategies Implementation and 
EPA Response: Hearings Before the House Subcomm on Oversight and Investigations Comm. on 
Commerce, 105th Congo (1998) (prepared statement of Eric Schaeffer, Director, Office of Regula-
tory Enforcement, EPA), available at hnp:llwww.epa.gov/ocirihearings/testimony/062398.htm. 
27. Id. 
28. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Viola-
tions, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (April II, 2000), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
binlgetdoc.cgi?dbname=2000_register&docid=OO-8954-filed. The policy seeks to promote auditing 
and other internal review processes by granting enforcement leniency to fIrms that voluntarily dis-
close and correct violations that they discover. Id. at 19,619-20. Unlike many state laws, however, 
it does not provide immunity for violations voluntarily disclosed as a result of such self-policing 
programs, nor does it create a privilege from disclosure for materials generated by such programs. 
Id. at 19,623-24. 
29. Small Business Compliance Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,630 (April II, 2000) superceding 61 
Fed. Reg. 27,984 (June 3, 1996)), available at 
hnp:llwww.epa.gov/compliance/incentives/smallbusiness/index.htm!. Under the policy, the EPA 
will forego penalties entirely when a small business makes a "good-faith" effort to comply with 
environmental requirements. This is defIned to include situations where a small business voluntarily 
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The EPA also announced a preference for an "integrated" compli-
ance assurance approach--one that combines enforcement with compli-
ance assistance and/or compliance incentives. As summarized in one 
analysis, such approaches "are intrinsically rooted in the view that non-
compliance is rooted both in economic and institutional causes. In prin-
ciple, the strength of integrated approaches is the synergy that results 
from attacking mUltiple sources of noncompliance simultaneously, using 
an approach customized to the characteristics of a particular regulated 
community.,,30 An example of an integrated approach is combining an 
offer of compliance assistance to a particular regulated sector with a pub-
lic threat of increased inspections. In one such initiative directed at steel 
"minimills," one EPA regional office announced that facilities would 
have six months within which to conduct self-audits and disclose viola-
tions under EPA's self-audit/disclosure policy. After those six months, 
multimedia inspection teams would inspect all nonauditing facilities and 
take appropriate enforcement action.3l 
The EPA, as Professor Dan Farber notes, also "created," without any 
explicit statutory authority, a new type of enforcement mechanism that 
might be viewed as a "kinder, gentler" "stick"-the Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Project (SEP)?2 Under EPA's SEP policy, violators can re-
duce the size of a penalty they would otherwise be required to pay by 
reaching an agreement with the EPA to implement "environmentally 
beneficial projects which the [alleged violator] is not otherwise legally 
required to perform.,,33 Environmentally beneficial projects "must im-
discovers a violation (whether due to an audit. on-site compliance assistance, or other means), 
promptly discloses the violation to the EPA, and corrects it within six months (more time is permit-
ted if pollution prevention technologies are involved). Id. at 19,632-34. Small businesses are de-
fined under the policy as companies employing one hundred or fewer persons on a companywide 
basis. Id. at 19,632. 
30. Mark Stoughton, et aI., Toward Integrated Approaches to Compliance Assurance, 31 
ENVTL. L. REp. 11266, 11267-68 (2001). 
31. Id. at 11273-78. EPA staff reported to investigators that they believed these initiatives 
resulted in positive changes in attitude, increased understanding, and increased compliance by regu-
lated entities. They had not documented quantifiable improvements in compliance rates, however. 
[d. at 11278 n.89. They also reported their belief that these approaches were more cost effective than 
either traditional enforcement alone or compliance assistance alone. Id. at 11278 n.90. 
32. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in 
Environmental Law, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 297, 309-10 (1999). Final EPA Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Projects Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796 (May 5, 1998), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/civilprograms/seps/index.html. Professor Breger describes the SEP 
policy as an "extensively articulated effort to approximate individuated regulation in settlement 
agreements." Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TuLsA LJ. 
325,337 (1996). 
33. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, supra note 32, at 24,798. 
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prove, protect, or reduce risks to public health or the environment at 
large" and can include pollution prevention, facility assessments and au-
dits, compliance promotion, or other activities.34 
In short, the existing reality of environmental enforcement is that 
enforcers do not rigidly or uniformly enforce the law in a one-size-fits-all 
approach. Rather, enforcement is carried out pragmatically, with enforc-
ers employing a variety of means to attain compliance. As discussed 
below, this flexible approach is facilitated by the fact that the current en-
forcement process contains tremendous discretion at numerous decision 
points. 
B. Discretionary Points in the Current Enforcement Process 
More so than with any of the other back-end adjustment mechanisms 
discussed by Professors Shapiro and Glicksman, the enforcement process 
is filled with discretionary decision points at literally every stage of the 
process. Indeed, as Professor Robert Kuehn has aptly noted, "few areas 
of the law invest more discretion in agency employees or are more hid-
den from the public's view and oversight than an agency's enforcement 
actions.,,35 This discretion is amplified because there are far more regu-
lated entities than resources available to police all of them. One survey 
of Clean Water Act enforcement, for example, found that most enforce-
ment staff see themselves as having quite a bit of discretion in a variety 
of enforcement tasks. For example, over 40% reported having "a great 
deal" or "total" discretion in carrying out inspections; 49% reported hav-
ing discretion in issuing administrative orders; 42% reported having dis-
cretion in issuing notices of violation; and 60% reported having discre-
tion in issuing warning letters (including 15% who said they had total 
discretion in this task).36 
Of the innumerable discretionary decision points in the enforcement 
process, consider, for example, the discretion involved in determining 
which facilities to inspect. Most environmental statutes do not mandate 
any type of inspection schedule (or even that inspections occur). Of the 
hundreds of thousands of facilities subject to environmental require-
34. [d. Settlements involving SEPs must, however, recoup economic benefit, plus at least a 
small percentage of gravity-based penalties. [d. at 24,801. Moreover, in general, 80 percent of the 
cost of a SEP can be used to offset penalties. [d. at 24,802. 
35. Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 9 ST. 
JOHN'SJ. LEOALCOMMENT, 625, 640 (1994). 
36. HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 16, at 89. 
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ments, only a small portion of even the largest facilities are inspected 
each year.37 Moreover, there are different levels of inspections, reflect-
ing different degrees of comprehensiveness. Many agencies target facili-
ties for inspection based on their past history of noncompliance, com-
plaints from the community, or potential for environmental harm; others 
inspect facilities more randomly. Other research has found that political 
factors such as community affluence and the probability of plant closure 
are positively related to likelihood of inspection38 and that resource con-
straints influences the stringency of EPA inspections.39 Obviously, if a 
facility is not inspected or is inspected less rigorously, it is far less likely 
that it will be found in violation of regulatory requirements and sanc-
tioned. 
If a facility is found in noncompliance, an agency then has the dis-
cretion to respond in multiple ways, ranging from doing nothing, to in-
formal actions (such as a phone call, a warning letter, a site visit, or a 
notice of violation), or to formal actions (administrative, civil, or crimi-
nal enforcement). Even determining when a facility is in noncompliance 
can be a subjective, discretionary process. Indeed, because of the rela-
tively relaxed mens rea requirements for criminal liability under most 
environmental statutes, many violations of environmental requirements, 
in theory, could be prosecuted administratively, civilly, or criminally. 
The EPA has adopted various guidance documents to help inform the 
exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial discretion. But these 
documents are not binding on the agency. Moreover, many states do not 
have such formal policies. Ultimately, the decision about whether to en-
force and what type of enforcement action to take turns on highly subjec-
tive factors and "'rests entirely in [the] discretion' of the enforcer.'.40 
37. See Eric S. Schaeffer, Encouraging Voluntary Compliance Without Compromising En-
forcement: EPA's 1995 Auditing Policy, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 4TH INTERNATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 451, 453 (1996) (indicating that 
"[b]y one estimate, at least 700,000 facilities are subject to one or more federal environmental laws, 
while the federal government and states together conduct fewer than 1 00,000 inspections per year"); 
AI Iannuzzi, Self-Regulation-Has Its Time Come?, 33 ENVTL. L. REp. 10917,10918 (2003) (citing 
an EPA report that over two year period, 34 percent of facilities considered "large sources" were 
inspected, and of these, less than 1 percent received an inspection in all three media-air, water, and 
hazardous waste). 
38. Eric Helland, The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections. Violations and Self-
Reponing, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 141, 152 (1998). 
39. Eric Helland, The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs: Stringency. Enforcement. and Sub-
stitution, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 242, 258-60 (1998). 
40. Jeremy Firestone, Enforcement of Pollution Laws and Regulations: An Analysis of Forum 
Choice, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 105, 119 (2003) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
364 (1978». 
1336 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
And there is some empirical evidence that non-statutory factors influence 
enforcement choices. One study of Clean Water Act enforcement by the 
EPA found that the higher the unemployment rate in a state, the fewer 
violations the EPA referred for judicial enforcement.41 Another analysis 
of over 300 Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act (CAA), and RCRA penalty 
actions found that the EPA was less likely to criminally charge very large 
firms and government agencies than smaller or medium sized firms. 
Moreover, small firms were more than twice as likely as large firms to 
face criminal sanctions even after taking into account the harm from a 
violation.42 
Any decision to actually assess penalties entails additional, substan-
tial discretion. Many environmental statutes provide for an enormous 
range of penalties, ranging from $0-$25,000 per day per violation (the 
amounts actually are higher now with inflationary adjustments mandated 
by federal law). The EPA has developed penalty policies to guide its 
discretion, but these policies nonetheless leave substantial room for 
judgment calls, such as determining the potential harm from noncompli-
ance, a company's "good faith" efforts to remedy a violation, a violator's 
culpability, and other mitigating factors. Two commentators explain the 
role of discretion in enforcement as follows: 
[T]he specificity of [EPA and state penalty policies] seems to imply 
that enforcement decisions are made only by objective, analytical crite-
ria. This is not true. Both EPA and state agencies will not pursue 
many cases that meet the articulated criteria for enforcement for a vari-
ety of reasons, including limited enforcement resources, questions re-
garding the likelihood of success in the litigation ... and the inability 
of the violator to pay a substantial civil penalty. . .. [T]he adjusting 
factors are the most subjective. How willful or negligent was the viola-
tion? How cooperative was the violator? These factors can be viewed 
favorably or unfavorably depending on the sensibilities and predisposi-
tions of the government employee doing the calculation.43 
Not surprisingly, environmental penalties vary widely between the EPA 
and the states, as well as among the states. An EPA study of RCRA en-
41. HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 16, at 120. 
42. Firestone, supra note 40, at 146, 158. 
43. Bill S. Forcade & Elizabeth D. Anderson, How to Minimize Civil Penalties in Environ· 
mental Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11031, 11 034, 11036 (2000). One study of administrative 
penalties filed by the EPA showed that for firms with large parent companies, firm size significantly 
impacted the amount of sanctions assessed. Kelly Lear-Nordby, An Empirical Examination of EPA 
Administrative Fines (Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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forcement in thirteen states found a "wide variation" in the average size 
of penalties assessed.44 A study of CAA enforcement in several states 
likewise noted that average penalties assessed ranged from over $68,000 
in Michigan to under $2,500 in California.45 Non-statutory factors ap-
pear to influence penalty determination as well. One study comparing 
state administrative enforcement under RCRA found that unemployment 
rates significantly affected the size of penalties.46 Another analysis de-
termined that the EPA levied higher fines in states whose citizens par-
ticipated in environmental organizations at greater rates and also in states 
and congressional districts that had members of Congress who had EPA 
oversight responsibilities.47 And as discussed in more detail below, there 
is some evidence, albeit mixed, that penalties assessed in minority com-
munities are systematically lower than in white communities. 
Finally, decisions about funding enforcement programs, and allocat-
ing enforcement resources are both of considerable import and are highly 
discretionary. As discussed below, enforcement resources have been 
stretched thin in recent years, meaning that even more discretionary en-
forcement choices have to be made. 
C. Current Use of Enforcement Discretion to Make Back-End 
Adjustments to Regulation 
Although not explicitly discussed in such terms, many agencies al-
ready informally employ extensive enforcement discretion to make back-
end adjustments. Specifically, they use their discretion to effectively 
overlook individual violations, obtain agreements by regulated entities to 
go beyond compliance, reorder priorities, or fine-tune regulatory policy. 
The discussion below highlights a few of the many instances in which 
this occurs. 48 
44. OFFICE OF INSPECfOR GEN., U.s. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FuRTHER IMPROVEMENTS 
NEEDED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF RCRA CIVIL PENALTIES, Rep. No. 19, EIDSF6-11-0002-
7100146 at 19 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/oigearthlreportslI997/rpentbl.htm. 
45. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONSOLIDATED REVIEW OF THE 
AIR ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, Rep. No. EIGAE5-05-0169-
7100306, at 26-7 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/199717100306.pdf. 
46. Mark Atlas, Law of the Lands: Analyzing State Environmental Enforcement Stringency (on 
file with author). 
47. James T. Hamilton, Going By the (Informal) Book: The EPA's Use of Informal Rules in 
Enforcing Hazardous Waste Laws, in 7 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, lNNov A-
TION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 109 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1996). 
48. Professor Farber has made a similar argument about environmental law more generally, 
contending that slippage between regulatory standards and the actual conduct of regulated parties is 
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An example of using the enforcement process to excuse individual 
violations is Citizens for a Better Environment-California v. Unocal Oil 
CO.,49 a Clean Water Act case in which California sought, through the 
enforcement process, to postpone additional limits on the discharges of 
selenium from several refineries that it was reluctant to implement in the 
first place.5o Under section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act, states are re-
quired to identify waters for which water quality standards are unlikely 
to be achieved due to the discharge of toxic pollutants from point 
sources, including selenium, and to identify "individual control strate-
gies" for the point sources causing such pollution, which are designed to 
achieve water quality standards within three years.51 Acting in 1989, 
California initially failed to identify several portions of upper San Fran-
cisco Bay as impaired by seleniuni and failed to specify oil refinery sele-
nium discharges as a substantial cause of the selenium pollution. In re-
sponse, the EPA designated these portions of the Bay as "impaired 
waters" due to selenium pollution and attributed that selenium substan-
tially to the discharges from the six Bay Area refineries, including Uno-
cal's refinery. The EPA also indicated that it planned to issue its own 
individual control strategies for the refineries. At this point, California 
listed these portions of the Bay as impaired and amended the Clean Wa-
ter Act permits of Unocal and the other refineries, setting newer, more 
stringent discharge limits to become effective in three years and less 
stringent interim limits until that point. Unocal and the other refineries 
filed suit in state court to challenge these limits (and other related mat-
ters). While several of the refineries eventually reduced their discharge 
levels to comply with the final limits, Unocal (and two others) contended 
that they could not comply due to technological constraints. This argu-
ment was sympathetically received by the state; it settled the refineries' 
lawsuit by agreeing to extend the stricter discharge limits for an addi-
tional five years. In return, the refineries agreed to pay the state $ 2 mil-
lion. In doing so, the state effectively modified the Clean Water Act's 
rules on controlling toxic pollution in impaired water bodies for Unocal 
and the other two refineries.52 
pervasive. Farber, supra note 32, at 300 ("Regulatory slippage is as central to environmental law as 
water resistance is to aquatic Iife-a ubiquitous condition that limits efforts at movement and shapes 
the design and development of everything it surrounds."). 
49. 83 F.3d II11 (9th Cir. 1996). A more detailed discussion of the factual issues underlying 
the case can be found in the district court opinion at 861 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
50. Citizens for a Better Environment, 83 F.3d at 1114. 
51. 33 U.S.C. §§ 13l7(a), 13l4(1 )(1)(8) (2000). 
52. Citizen groups successfully argued, however .. that the state's settlement should not preclude 
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Another example concerns efforts by the State of California to ex-
pand fossil fuel capacity during California's energy travails in 2000 and 
2001 through reliance on so-called "peaker plants." These simple cycle 
power plants often have little or no pollution controls, and some bum 
heavily polluting fuels such as distillate oil; as a result, they are limited 
in the hours that they can operate. The State, however, proposed that 
such "peakers," including one operated by Mirant Corporation in a pre-
dominantly African-American community in San Francisco, be allowed 
to operate for longer hours than permitted by their permits. The EPA and 
the local Bay Area Air Quality Management District then tried to immu-
nize these violations by signing administrative enforcement agreements 
that called for mitigation payments in lieu of compliance with the per-
mit's requirements. Community groups eventually were successful in 
forcing Mirant to abide by its permit limits.53 
On the other hand, sometimes agencies use the enforcement process 
to impose broader or more stringent requirements than what is required 
by law. For example, under EPA's SEP policy, mentioned above, the 
agency has traded penalties in exchange for pollution prevention pro-
grams or other "beyond compliance" efforts that a regulated entity oth-
erwise would not be required to undertake. Likewise, OSHA sometimes 
will settle an enforcement action directed at an individual facility by get-
ting an employer to agree to undertake corporate-wide measures that go 
beyond compliance. 54 
In other instances, agencies use the enforcement process to ignore 
categories of violations. This selective inattention can have the same 
effect as revising legislative or regulatory requirements, as Professor Ash 
Bhagwat notes: 
[I]n the modem administrative state, a huge number of industries are 
characterized by pervasive regulation, where almost any activity of the 
regulated entities occurs within a web of regulatory requirements. 
When an agency overseeing such an industry enforces one part of a 
regulatory scheme but not another, or exempts particular entities from 
regulatory requirements, it is effectively amending comprehensive 
regulatory schemes. 55 
a private enforcement action for penalties under the Clean Water Act. Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment, 83 F.3d at 1116-18. 
53. Alan Ramo, California's Energy Crisis-the Perils of Crisis Management and a Challenge 
to Environmental Justice, 7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 1,20-21 (2002). 
54. Sidney Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE LJ. 389, 403 (2003). 
55. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 179-80 (1996) 
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One specific illustration of this is the EPA's enforcement history un-
der the new source review (NSR) program of the Clean Air Act. The 
program requires that new major stationary sources or existing sources 
undergoing major modifications obtain a permit and install stringent 
technology-based controls.56 Activities that constitute "routine mainte-
nance, repair, and replacement," however, do not trigger new source re-
view.57 For many years, numerous large sources, such as power plants, 
under the guise of conducting such "routine" activities, performed major 
overhauls and major replacements to extend the lives of the plants.58 
EPA enforced this requirement inconsistently or not at all.59 Conse-
quently, the new source review requirement was routinely evaded. 
Under the Clinton Administration, the EPA decided to make non-
compliance with NSR a major priority. It initiated a series of investiga-
tions and enforcement actions against utilities for violating NSR re-
quirements, filed a number of civil suits, and issued dozens of notices of 
violations.60 It effectively breathed life back into these requirements. 
President Bush, by contrast, has taken the position that the NSR rules 
are inefficient and discourage new investment. In 2002 and 2003, the 
Administration issued a package of reforms for the program, including 
changes to the routine maintenance, repair, and replacement exemption. 
Under these changes, many of the previously unlawful modifications 
would have been permissible. As settlement negotiations in several pre-
viously filed cases against utilities stalled, former EPA enforcement offi-
cials charged that political pressure from the White House, as well as the 
announcement of the rule changes, undermined their bargaining posi-
tion.61 The Administration subsequently announced that it was dropping 
(citations omitted). 
56. Facilities in nonattainment areas must achieve the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate 
(LAER). See 42 U.S.c. § 7503(a)(2) (2000) ("[Tlhe proposed source is required to comply with the 
lowest achievable emission rate."). Facilities in attainment areas must adopt Best Available Control 
Technology (BACn, See id. § 7475(a)(4) ("[TJhe proposed facility is subject to the best available 
control technology for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from, or which 
results from, such facility."). 
57. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(2)(iii)(a) (2004). 
58. Utility managers at industry conferences were specifically counseled to describe their ac-
tivities as "routine maintenance" rather than "modifications" to stay off EPA's radar screen. James 
A. Lofton, Environmental Enforcement: The Impact of Cultural Values and Attitudes on Social 
Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10906,10912-13 (2001). 
59. Id. at 10913. 
60. Id. 
61. Darren Samuelsohn, Bush's NSR Reforms Harming Enforcement Cases, Former EPA Offi-
cial Says, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY (Feb. 9, 2004); Letter from Eric V. Schaeffer, Director, Office of 
Regulatory Enforcement, to Christine Whitman, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (Feb. 27, 2002). 
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investigations against approximately fifty facilities whose activIties 
would not run afoul of the new reforms, even though, according to the 
EPA's longstanding position, their actions were unlawful at the time they 
were undertaken. The effect of this non-enforcement stance is in many 
ways the same as a retroactive repeal of the NSR standards. As one EPA 
lawyer told the New York Times: "If you say, 'I'm not going to enforce 
the law at all,' that is doing rule-making without a rule-making proc-
ess.,,62 More recently, EPA Administrator Leavitt announced that the 
EPA would in fact continue to prosecute companies for NSR violations.63 
A slightly different illustration is the systematic reluctance of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to criminally 
prosecute employers for workplace accidents and deaths. Under the Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Act (OSH Act), it is a criminal offense to 
cause the death of a worker by willfully violating safety requirements.64 
According to an investigative report by the New York Times, from 1982 
to 2002, OSHA determined that 1,242 worker fatalities were the result of 
willful safety violations by employers.65 Yet in ninety-three percent of 
these cases, OSHA declined to refer the matter for criminal prosecu-
tion.66 Moreover, the investigation found that, since 1990, OSHA has 
agreed as part of settling some enforcement actions to recharacterize vio-
lations as "unclassified" rather than willfu1.67 There is no reference to 
"unclassifed" violations in the OSH Act or its implementing regulations. 
Rather, according to the investigation, the term was developed (by de-
fense lawyers and later accepted by OSHA) as a way to preclude possible 
criminal prosecution and is now included in OSHA's field manua1.68 
62. Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Lawyers at E.P.A. Say it Will Drop Pollution 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at AI. 
63. Government Resumes Enforcement Actions Under Clean Air New Source Review Program, 
35 ENV'T REp. 197 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
64. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(e) (2003). 
65. David Barstow, U.S. Rarely Seeks Charges For Deaths in Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2003, at AI. 
66. [d. The analysis also noted that in the year 2001 alone, EPA obtained 256 years of jail time 
for criminal violations. [d. at A29. For the twenty year period 1982 to 2002, OSHA obtained 30 
years of jail time. [d. 
67. [d. 
68. The policy of substituting unclassified violations for certain willful or repeat violations was 
announced in a 1991 memo, which authorizes the changes if an employer "decides to correct all 
violations but wishes to purge himself of the adverse public perception attached to a willful or re-
peated violation classification and is willing to pay all or almost all of the penalty and make other 
significant concessions." See Memorandum from Patricia Clark, Director, Directorate of Compli-
ance Programs, to Regional Administrators (Aug. 14, 1991), at 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show _document?p_table=INTERPRET A TIONS & 
p_id=20360 (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). 
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Thus, OSHA effectively has altered the statutory classification of viola-
tions to make its enforcement scheme more lenient. 
In some instances, the enforcement process is used to effectuate 
broader policy changes. One example is the EPA's use of enforcement 
discretion to modify the scope of liability under Superfund, (the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, or 
CERLCA). Through administrative guidance and policy documents, the 
EPA announced over a number of years that it would not pursue cost re-
covery actions against several categories of parties, effectively exempt-
ing them from potential liability under CERLCA. These categories of 
parties include residential property owners, very small ("de micromis") 
generators, "lending institutions that do not actively participate in their 
debtor's waste management decisions," prospective purchasers of 
"brownfield" sites, and generators of municipal solid waste.69 
Another example involves California's Proposition 65, a voter initia-
tive that requires businesses to provide "clear and reasonable" warnings 
prior to exposing individuals to chemicals that pose a significant risk of 
cancer or reproductive harm and that has no administrative compliance 
mechanism (it is enforced only through civil and citizen enforcement 
actions).70 During the mid-1990s, the California Attorney General 
brought a series of important actions against the manufacturers of various 
products containing lead, including brass faucets, tableware, and calcium 
supplements. In these cases, significant questions such as what concen-
tration of lead in the product met the statutory threshold, what the appro-
priate testing method for determining this should be, what warnings were 
appropriate, and in the case of calcium supplements, whether the lack of 
an immediately available supply of lead-free calcium justified a longer 
compliance period, were resolved through enforcement actions.71 Like-
wise, as a result of other enforcement positions, the Attorney General's 
Office has set policy as to whether, in calculating permissible exposures 
to listed reproductive toxins, it is appropriate to average exposures over 
69. ROBERT v. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 
256 (4th ed. 2003). For a highly critical argument that EPA uses the enforcement process to revise 
and extend environmental laws and regulations, see JAMES V. DELoNG, OUT OF BOUNDS, OUT OF 
CONTROL: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 41-55 (2002). 
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 25249.6 (West 1999). 
71. See Reynolds Holding, Tentative Accord in Faucet Suit: 7 Makers Would Phase out Lead in 
New Products, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 30, 1995, at A19; Court Approves Prop 65 Limits for Lead in 
Calcium Supplements, 5 FOOD LABELING NEWS 39, July 2, 1997, available at 1997 WL9737656; e-
mail from Edward Weil, Deputy Attorney General, California Attorney General's Office, to author 
(Feb. 9, 2004) (on file with author). 
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time, a key determinant in when warnings are required for such chemi-
cals.n The Attorney General's position has become the de facto rule for 
many in the regulated community in determining compliance. 
In summary, under the current system, agencies enforce environ-
mental law pragmatically and flexibly. They are able to do so because of 
the enormous discretion that exists at all stages of the enforcement proc-
ess. While not formally declaring it as such, agencies currently use their 
discretion to make back-end adjustments ranging from overlooking indi-
vidual violations to effecting policy changes. As discussed further be-
low, the lessons learned from this experience raise questions regarding 
the desirability of increasing enforcement discretion to achieve back-end 
adjustments. 
III. Is IT DESIRABLE TO GIVE AGENCIES MORE ENFORCEMENT 
DISCRETION IN ORDER TO FACILITATE BACK-END ADJUSTMENT? 
The book by Professor Shapiro and Glicksman brings to the fore the 
general question of whether entrusting agency personnel with more dis-
cretion is desirable policy. While it is far beyond the scope of this article 
to examine this issue in detail, it is worth highlighting a few general 
points before discussing the idea of enhanced enforcement discretion. 
The benefits of giving greater flexibility to enforcers and regulators 
are well known.73 Rules are, by their nature, general and over-inclusive. 
They cannot be drafted with adequate precision to deal with all possible 
situations that an agency will encounter in implementing the rules. Strict 
adherence to rules may result in economic inefficiency, either because 
compliance costs are greater than resulting social benefits or because 
compliance is not a cost-effective means for achieving a regulatory ob-
jective or leads to unfairness, such as when a firm has to shoulder a 
grossly disproportionate share of regulatory costs.74 "Discretion allows 
72. E-mail from Susan Fiering, Deputy Attorney General, State of California, to author (Feb. 3, 
2004) (on file with author). 
73. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to 
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277 (1982). 
74. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GoING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 58--62 (1982) (listing situations in which the mismatch "be-
tween uniform rules and diverse circumstances" produces unreasonable results); see also Farber, 
supra note 32, at 316-17 (arguing that enforcement discretion could lead to more efficient outcomes 
in which the costs and benefits of pollution control will be roughly matched, rather than making the 
level of pollution control independent of individual circumstances). 
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decisions to be tailored to the [individual] circumstances of each particu-
lar case.,,75 As Professor Carl Schneider has further explained: 
Sometimes a rule will, applied to a particular case, produce a result that 
conflicts with the rule's purpose. Discretion can allow the decision-
maker to promote the rule's purpose. Sometimes a rule will, [when] 
applied to a particular case, produce a result that conflicts with our un-
derstanding of what justice demands. Discretion can let the decision-
maker do justice. And sometimes the circumstances in which a rule 
must be applied will be so complex that no effective rule can be writ-
ten. Discretion frees the decision-maker to deal with that complexity.76 
The drawbacks are also familiar. The exercise of discretion by regu-
lators can undermine the legitimacy of rules and increase the potential 
for decisions to be based on bias or illegitimate factors. 77 It can result in 
decisions that are based on less information and deliberation and that are 
not as carefully reflected on as an underlying rule.78 Discretion can "en-
gender inefficiency by encouraging the unnecessary consideration of 
each decision afresh.,,79 It can violate the basic assumptions that like 
cases should be treated alike and that participants should be treated 
fairly. It can lead to less predictability for regulated entities by creating 
doubt as to what the rules of the game are. Furthermore, it can result in 
less transparency in decision-making. While rules are public in nature 
(publicly debated on and disseminated), discretion is usually exercised in 
private and less widely disseminated.80 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis 
famously warned against the dangers of affording prosecutors, govern-
ment regulators, and enforcement personnel too much enforcement dis-
cretion in his book, Discretionary Justice: "[t]he discretionary power of 
75. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 47, 
67 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation 
and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 436-37 (1999). ("Rules, after all, 
are necessarily imperfect; they cannot take into account every factor relevant to the appropriate 
disposition of a matter facing the agency. . .. It is hard to argue against empowering regulators with 
greater flexibility to better serve the purposes underlying regulation.") [hereinafter Siedenfeld, Bend-
ing the Rules]. 
76. Schneider, supra note 75, at 61. 
77. [d. at 68-69; see also Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law 
and Social Science, in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 75 at II, 15-16; Nicola Lacey, The 
Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm, in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 
75, at 361, 371. 
78. Schneider, supra note 75, at 72. 
79. Lacey, supra note 77, at 371. 
80. Schneider, supra note 75, at 74-77. 
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public officers ... to be lenient is ... susceptible to many kinds of abuse, 
including the worst sort of discrimination, favoritism, or caprice, and 
may be extremely damaging to private interests."sl 
Against this general backdrop, this section discusses some specific 
concerns about using the enforcement process to fine tune regulatory 
policy, particularly in light of our current experiences with the use of 
existing enforcement discretion to make back-end adjustments. 
A. Are We Asking Too Muchfrom Enforcement Staff? 
A threshold set of questions deals with the practicalities of entrusting 
enforcement staff with greater policy-making responsibility. Are en-
forcement personnel best suited to make back-end adjustments? Do en-
forcement personnel have adequate resources to assume the added re-
sponsibility, or will this unduly tax existing enforcement personnel, who 
are already stretched to the limit (and beyond)? 
Scholars who have advocated for a flexible enforcement approach 
note that fine-tuning through the enforcement process depends on having 
skilled, highly-professional agency personnel to adapt and shape rules to 
the individual circumstances of regulated entities.s2 For Professors Bar-
dach and Kagan, for example, the model is staff with experience in regu-
lated industries. The professors acknowledge that greater flexibility re-
quires additional time, knowledge, and money (including the need to 
document any instance of under enforcement).s3 
It is far from certain, however, that enforcement staff are the best 
equipped to make back-end adjustments. One concern is the nature of 
their expertise: enforcement staff may be best trained to deal with techni-
cal questions of monitoring and compliance but not best suited to deal 
with larger policy questions, such as the cost-effectiveness of various 
regulatory approaches. A second, related concern is perspective. En-
forcement staff often, although not always, work separately from the 
agency staff members who set standards or write permits. Enforcement 
staff may not have the same appreciation for the environmental and pub-
lic health costs and trade-offs that underlie regulatory requirements. A 
third concern is simply the pressure and time constraints under which 
81. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 231-32 (1969) 
(footnotes omitted). 
82. Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regulatory Bureaucracies, 
in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 19, at 3,13. 
83. Bardach & Kagan, supra note 74, at 155--60. 
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most enforcement decisions are made. Enforcement staff often have 
considerably less time for deliberation and reflection than those involved 
in the enactment of underlying rules (or even formal applications for 
regulatory waivers or negotiated exemptions such as Project XL) and 
may have a more one-sided informational base.84 As Matthew Zinn has 
observed: 
While an enforcer may be better placed than a rulemaker to understand 
the compliance costs of particular firms, that officer will likely have 
less information about the public costs of pollution: she will not have 
available the broad public input and time for reflection available in no-
tice and comment rulemaking. To ask agencies to make such decisions 
on a case-by-case basis during enforcement may assume considerable 
capacity that the agency lacks and may leave the agency at the mercy of 
an industry's superior knowledge of its own processes. 85 
On the other hand, in his detailed case study of water pollution control in 
Great Britain, regulatory scholar Keith Hawkins found that a system of 
informal bargaining and negotiation between inspectors and regulated 
entities was very effective at achieving compliance.86 
Another major question mark is resources; in the current-day envi-
ronment, resources for government enforcement are in short supply. 
Consider, for example, state spending on environmental protection. An 
analysis by a statelEPA task force in the late 1990s estimated that there 
was a gap of $735 million to $960 million between state spending on 
water quality programs and state needs for fully implementing the Clean 
Water Act.87 In Fiscal Year 2002, thirty of forty-two states responding to 
84. This point was underscored by Dave Cozad, a supervising EPA attorney who panicipated in 
this symposium. He noted that state agencies and EPA often lack the expertise about individual 
industries that is necessary to make individualized, back-end adjustments, and that if more back-end 
adjustments occurred, agencies would have to rely heavily on information provided by regulated 
entities. David Cozad, Responsive Remarks to Articles Presented at the Kansas Law Review Sym-
posium on Reforming Environmental Law: Can Regulation Be More Adaptive?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1401 (2004). 
85. Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, 
and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 102-03 (2002). Professor Kagan, by contrast, argues 
that regulatory agencies have time to gather information and engage in further dialogue with execu-
tives, engineers and employees in regulated entities to gauge the seriousness of violation (in contrast 
with police who must make assessments about leniency on the spot), although he acknowledges that 
risks from regulatory violation may be uncertain. Robert A. Kagan, On Regulatory lnspectorates 
and Police, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 19, at 37, 56-57. 
86. See KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL 
DEFINmONOFPOLLUTION 110-54 (1984). 
87. ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATORS, 
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a survey indicated that they cut their environmental budgets by an aver-
age of 6%.88 In Fiscal Year 2003, overall state spending on environ-
mental protection and natural resources programs dropped by another 
1.6%.89 A recent survey I conducted of state Clean Water Act permitting 
programs found that numerous states had been forced to freeze or cut-
back compliance, enforcement, and other staff.90 Even before this period 
of budget difficulties, a number of states were having to choose between 
devoting adequate staff to compliance assistance programs or traditional 
enforcement activities because of resource shortfalls. 
The EPA also has seen its enforcement resources stretched thinner in 
recent years. For its first three years in office, the Bush Administration 
cut back EPA's proposed budget before submitting it to Congress.91 
From 2001 to 2003, EPA's enforcement and inspection staff declined by 
over 12%.92 The EPA estimates that it will conduct almost 25% fewer 
inspections in fiscal year 2004 than it did four years earlier.93 A 2003 
Knight-Ridder study found that most indices of enforcement activity for 
the major environmental statutes had dropped in the first three years of 
the Bush Administration.94 Since September 11, 2001, numerous crimi-
nal investigators from the EPA have been assigned to help work on 
STATE WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT REsOURCE ANALYSIS: INTERIM REPORT ON REsULTS (April 
I, 2002), available at hnp:llwww.asiwpca.orglprograrns/docslgap.pdf. The analysis covers only 
state management activities, not spending on infrastructure improvements. A review of the Gap 
Analysis by the National Academy of Public Administration concluded that its estimate of the re-
source gap is sound, and if anything, is probably low because it does not include the costs of new 
and expanding water programs and may also underestimate the costs of state employees. NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF PuBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNDERSTANDING WHAT STATES NEED To PROTECT W A-
TER QUALITY 1 (2002). 
88. R. Steven Brown, Coping With the Budget Crunch: When the Axe Falls-How State Envi-
ronmental Agencies Deal with Budget Cuts, ECOSTATES, Winter 2002, at 16, 17, available at 
hnp:llwww.sso.orglecoslpublications.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004). 
89. R. Steven Brown & Michael J. Kiefer, ECOS Budget Survey: Budgets are Bruised. But Still 
Strong, ECOSTATES, Summer 2003, at 10, 15, available at hnp:llwww.sso.orglecosl (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2004). 
90. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century: Har-
nessing the Powerofa Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REv. 775, 790--794 (2004). 
91. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
QUEST ON EPA ENFORCEMENT REsOURCES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, Rep. No. 2004-S-OOOO1, at 9 
(Oct. 10,2003). 
92. See ROBERT PERKS & GREGORY WETSTONE, NATURAL REs. DEF. COUNCIL, REWRITING 
THE RULES, YEAR-END REPORT 2002: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ASSAULT ON THE ENVIRON-
MENT 26 (Jan. 2(03), hnp:llwww.nrdc.org/legislation/rollbackslrr2002.pdf. 
93. FY 2005 EPA ANN. PERFORMANCE PLAN & CONGo Justification 69, 
http://www.epa.gov/octopage!budgetl2005/apgmfinal.pdf(last modified Mar. 19, 2004). 
94. Seth Borenstein, Far Fewer Polluters Punished Under Bush Administration. Records Show, 
COMMON DREAMS NEWSCENTER (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.commondrearns.orglheadlines0311209-
02.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
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homeland security investigations and also to provide protective services 
when the EPA Administrator travels.95 
These factors raise concerns about the ability of enforcement staff to 
handle additional, complex decision-making responsibilities. 
B. Will Enforcement Discretion Be Conducted Outside the Public 
Realm and Unduly Diminish the Public's Role in Setting Policy? 
One of the potent objections raised by Professor Davis to enforce-
ment discretion is the lack of transparency traditionally accompanying 
most decisions: 
[A]dministrative choices to enforce or not to enforce are often made by 
a single officer, usually unsupervised, usually unchecked, almost al-
ways without a systematic statement of findings, almost always without 
a reasoned opinion, usually without any reporting to anyone of pres-
sures or extraneous influences, and almost always without opportunity 
for the fublic to observe what is done or undone or with what motiva-
tions. 9 
Professors Shapiro and Glicksman are insistent about insuring a 
meaningful opportunity for public participation in back-end adjustments. 
As discussed below, there are serious questions about how feasible it is 
to do this. Even if one could fashion an expanded rol~ for the public in 
the enforcement process, it is doubtful whether public interest environ-
mental and/or community groups would take advantage of such opportu-
nities and participate in enforcement decisions. 
As elaborated in more detail below,97 the context in which back-end 
enforcement adjustments occur does not encourage public involvement. 
Enforcement decisions are decentralized, have low visibility, and are 
relatively limited in scope and impact (to individual sites or facilities). 
Involvement by regional or national environmental groups often will not 
generate significant public attention or membership benefits for them. It 
95. CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST ON EPA ENFORCEMENT REsOURCES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 
supra note 91, at 15. 
96. Davis, supra note 81, at 167. See also Farber, supra note 9, at 319 ("Slippage erodes [guar-
antees of transparency and accountability]." Many actions in which important policy is made "oper-
ate outside of full public view" and "do not contain the usual opportunities for public input or the 
normal mandates for deliberative decisionmaking. They take place, in other words, very much in the 
shadow of the law, not in the light ofpubJic deliberation."). 
97. See infra Section IV.B. 
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is thus far less cost-effective for such organizations to participate in en-
forcement decisions than in centralized legislative or rule making activ-
ity. Local community groups may be much more interested in the out-
come of specific enforcement actions, but there is no guarantee that such 
groups will be present in every community in which regulated entities 
operate. Moreover, many local groups will lack the resources and/or 
technical expertise to participate fully in the enforcement process. Un-
fortunately, technical expertise tends to be especially lacking in low in-
come communities of color, where a disproportionate share of polluting 
facilities are located. 
As Professor Rena Steinzor has noted in her study of Project XL, 
another flexible regulatory initiative, a back-end adjustment process may 
lead to a reduced role for the public in fashioning policy: 
Citizens concerned about environmental quality have organized na-
tional groups to represent their interests in the context of industry-wide 
rules developed by legislatures or regulatory agencies. The organiza-
tion of such groups is crucial because the diffuse impact of many envi-
ronmental problems means that individual citizens do not have an ade-
quate stake in the outcome of such debates to inspire their participation. 
Changing the terms on which environmental groups influence the pol-
icy-making process, not to mention the costs they face in doing so, by 
shifting regulation from the federal and state to a site-specific level will 
severely limit their ability to participate, leaving that task to local citi-
zens who mayor may not have similar expertise.98 
C. Will Greater Enforcement Discretion Lead to Capture or Special 
Interest Domination? 
A related concern with affording agencies greater enforcement dis-
cretion is that it may lead to agency capture or special interest domina-
tion. As Professor Mark Seidenfeld notes, "[a]s regulators' discretion 
increases, so does the potential for special interest groups to influence 
agency policy.,,99 He reasons as follows: 
[a]lthough evidence suggests that traditional capture mechanisms are 
not a pervasive problem today, that does not mean that domination is 
not a potential threat or that particular interest groups no longer exert 
98. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from 
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 103, 144 (1998). 
99. Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules, supra note 75, at 459. 
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undue influence on agency decisionmaking. . . . Nonetheless, within 
niches of an agency's policy domain, firms in regulated industries and 
interest groups with strong central staffs still occupy a favored position 
in regulatory and political structures that allows them an advantage in 
influencing agency decisions. They have the incentive and means to 
monitor what the agency does on a day-to-day basis. They often have 
information without which a regulatory agency cannot do its job. IOO 
Scholars have noted the general dangers of special interest ascen-
dancy inherent in environmental law because of its complexity and the 
intangible nature of many benefits realized by environmental regula-
tion. 101 These risks are heightened during the enforcement process. 
Most enforcement decisions, such as who to inspect, what type of en-
forcement response is appropriate, or when to assess penalties, are 
opaque-much more so than the development of regulatory policy. 102 
100. Id. at 462-64. Professor Howard Latin similarly argues that it is virtually inevitable that 
agencies will consider social and economic impacts in their decisions (whether the law allows them 
to or not), and that their desire to avoid criticism and controversy will increase their responsiveness 
to industry points of view. Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the 
New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1649 (1991). This is because "[i]ndustry representatives 
appear regularly in agency proceedings and can usually afford to offer detailed comments and criti-
cisms on possible agency decisions, while environmental groups intervene on an intermittent basis 
and the unorganized public seldom participates at all. This routine asymmetry will increase agency 
responsiveness to industry criticisms." Id. at 1673. Moreover, agency staff and industry representa-
tives must work together on a continuing basis to implement environmental control programs-
permit compliance, site inspections, and so forth. These continuous contacts with regulated parties 
are likely to sensitize agency personnel to the problems and priorities of industry employees. For a 
contrary and more optimistic view, see DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM 197 (1999). Profes-
sor Farber contends that we can trust the EPA to exercise any additional discretionary authority 
responsibly, noting that "political actors have leamed by now that the public responds angrily to 
efforts to undermine the environment." Id. 
101. See Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1495, 
1548-49 (1999). 
Id. 
Almost any government action creates winners and losers, and contending interests will 
vie to end up on the positive side of the ledger. But the complexity and opacity of many 
environmental issues and the public's difficulty in perceiving its own interest make the 
risk of special interest manipulation much more severe in the environmental realm than in 
other fields of regulation or government activity. Simply put, the average citizen knows 
if he or she is getting adequate roads or schools and even has a sense of whether the gov-
ernment regulation of banks seems appropriate. In many environmental circumstances, 
however, no comparable basis for judging the adequacy of outcomes exists. Does the 
government standard for residue of the pesticide allidochlor on com at a level of 0.05 
parts per million protect human health? Are particulate levels in the air of 15 micrograms 
per cubic meter safe? Should radionuclides in drinking water be eliminated? The public 
has no way to judge. In this non-transparent world, the threats of special interest manipu-
lation and public choice failures are very real and often very large. 
102. See Zinn, supra note" 85, at 128 ("Enforcement is most inscrutable ... when an agency 
brings no enforcement action at all. Those decisions are invisible outside the agency, because no one 
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Moreover, as noted above, enforcement actions are diffuse; the public 
typically lacks the resources or motivation to participate in typically low-
stake, individual actions. At the same time, the enforcement process 
brings regulators and regulated entities in close and frequent contact, in-
cluding in circumstances in which regulators may work more as educa-
tors and consultants than inspectors or punishers and seek to solve prob-
lems jointly to bring facilities into compliance.103 As one commentator 
has explained, the "confluence of obscurity and familiarity allows agen-
cies and regulated firms to move closer together."I04 In one study, three 
quarters of CW A enforcers surveyed took into account "extenuating cir-
cumstances" when enforcing the law; almost half said they considered 
the state of the local economy.105 Another study, by contrast, found that 
more experienced inspectors for the Office of Surface Mining and Rec-
lamation and inspectors with more critical views of the regulated indus-
try issued more notices of violation. 106 
Critics have charged that under existing approaches, enforcement 
staff are susceptible to special interest influence and use the enforcement 
process to blunt more vigorous citizen enforcement efforts. Professor 
David Rodas, for example, has argued that many state enforcement ac-
tions are "prompted by the state's and polluter's desire to preempt citizen 
suits after the polluter receives a 60-day" notice of intent to sue.107 The 
states preclude "citizen suits by entering into mild enforcement consent 
orders" with extended compliance schedules and de minimis penalties. 108 
I observed this dynamic during the early 1990s when I was practicing 
with the California Attorney General's Office, which had lead enforce-
ment authority for Proposition 65, the anti-toxics initiative discussed 
above. The Attorney General during this time, Dan Lungren, was widely 
else may know that violations have occurred and that the enforcement agency has decided to take no 
action."). 
103. Clifford RechIschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environ-
mental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1222 (1998). 
104. Zinn, supra note 85 at 126-27; see id. at 126-32 (describing reasons why risks of capture 
are particularly high in environmental enforcement context, including close proximity of regulators 
and regulated firms, asymmetric participation in enforcement proceedings by regulated firms and 
public interest groups; opacity of proceedings; and considerable opportunities for exercise of discre-
tion). ' 
105. HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 16, at 90-92. 
106. David M. Hedge, et aI., Regulatory Attitudes and Behavior: The Case of Surface Mining 
Regulation, 41 W. POL. Q. 323, 329 (1988). 
107. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can 
Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United States, the States. and 
Their Citizens? 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1622 (1995). 
108. [d. at 1621-22. 
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perceived to be pro-business and unfriendly to environmental concerns. 
On at least two or three occasions when environmental groups filed 60-
day notices of intent to sue to enforce Proposition 65, the potential de-
fendants literally pleaded with the Attorney General's Office to file suit 
and oust the citizen enforcers. 
Consider also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, Inc.,I09 a case that the Supreme Court eventually decided on 
standing grounds. llo In that case, Laidlaw violated its Clean Water Act 
permit governing mercury discharges several hundred times over the 
course of five years. III After a citizens group filed a 60-day notice based 
on the violations, the state Department of Health and Environmental 
Control initiated enforcement proceedings.1I2 The state's normal prac-
tice in this situation was to file administrative enforcement actions, and it 
intended to do so after receiving the notice. But in response to the spe-
cific request of defendant's counsel in this case, the state instead filed a 
judicial action in order to preclude the citizen action from going for-
ward. 113 The state and Laidlaw then settled the matter in an "exceedingly 
fast" manner, without an opportunity for the citizen groups to intervene, 
and on terms highly favorable to the defendant. The low penalty im-
posed did not attempt to capture the economic benefit obtained from 
noncompliance; no injunction required Laidlaw to comply with its per-
mit, although there was a requirement that it make "every effort" to 
comply; and the state released liability for future violations without 
stipulated penalties (contrary to its usual policy).114 Not only were the 
complaint and consent order filed on the last day of the 60-day notice 
period, but Laidlaw's counsel actually drafted both the complaint and the 
order, filed the lawsuit, and paid the court filing fee that day.1I5 (The 
district court hearing the matter ruled that the state's action did not con-
stitute "diligent prosecution" so as to bar a citizen enforcement action 
against Laidlaw.)116 
109. 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995), vacated, 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 167 
(2000). 
1I0. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 180-89. 
Ill. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 475-77. 
1I2. Id. at 477. 
1l3. Id. at 478-79. 
114. Id. at 478-80. 
liS. Id. at 479. 
116. Id. at 498. There are numerous other examples of what appear to be "defendant-friendly" 
enforcement actions filed by government agencies to preclude citizen enforcement. See, e.g., Citi-
zens Legal Envtl. Action Network, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., No. 97-6073-CV-SJ-6, 
2000 WL 220464, at *13-14 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2000) (finding that broad release of all potential 
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Another recent Clean Water Act case likewise illustrates the risks of 
capture, in this instance the capture of an individual regulator. The un-
derlying activity in this matter was a wetlands fill project conducted 
without a permit. The court found that the Corps of Engineers employee 
assigned to determine whether the fill was illegal solicited input from his 
personal friends who worked for one of the defendants, wrote memos 
disparaging counsel for plaintiffs who had filed a citizen enforcement 
action, and then determined that the defendants had not violated the law, 
even though he consulted no regulatory guidance, inspected no part of 
the site, and had no experience or training on the issue. 117 
Thus, providing regulators with additional enforcement discretion 
could exacerbate the already-existing tendency toward special interest 
influence or domination. Professors Shapiro and Glicksman are keenly 
aware of this problem, and their suggested remedy is additional public 
participation and judicial review.1I8 As discussed below, these solutions 
may not be fully effective in practice. But to give Shapiro and Glicks-
man their full due, if the adjustment process they envision successfully 
works to increase public scrutiny of, and involvement in, enforcement 
decisions, it could not only safeguard the integrity of the adjustment 
process, but it could also counteract some of the current tendencies to-
ward capture/special interest domination and thus be an improvement 
over the existing system. As noted earlier, most enforcement decisions, 
like the settlement negotiated in Laidlaw, are made in private, with little 
claims that could have been brought by state does not constitute diligent prosecution where state did 
not actually prosecute claims, no penalties were paid by defendant, and no legal obligations were 
imposed on the defendant beyond complying with existing law); Culbertson v. Coats Am., Inc., 913 
F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (finding state agency did not diligently prosecute defendant's 
violations of copper and zinc limits when its actions "fundamentally consist[ ed] of a series of exten-
sions of compliance deadlines such that" defendant was not required "to meet the copper and zinc 
standards of its NPDES permit") 
117. No. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, No. C-OI-04686 WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1008, at *42-47 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2004). Another example involves Smithfield Foods, a 
Virginia company that committed over five thousand violations of its CW A discharge permit from 
1991 to 1996, which contributed to the closure of shellfish harvesting in the Pagan River. Virginia 
had first chosen not to impose any penalties on the company, then sought penalties in amounts far 
lower than requested by EPA. At the time, Smithfield was contributing to the governor's political 
action committee, and also repeatedly threatened to leave Virginia if state regulators were too strict. 
EPA eventually "overfiled" against Smithfield, charging that the case was part of a pattern in which 
Virginia attempted to insulate violating industries from Federal enforcement by bringing very light 
enforcement actions. See Hearing on the Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Federal State Rela-
tions Before the S. Comm. On Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo (1997) (statement of Lois Schif-
fer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Env't and Natural Res. Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/l05thldoL6-10.htm. 
118. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, at 27-28, 193-97. 
1354 KANSAS LAW REvIEW [Vol. 52 
or no public input. Agencies do not have to disclose when and why they 
refrain from enforcement, exercise enforcement leniency, or otherwise 
account for their exercise of discretion. So while greater special interest 
influence is one possible outcome of expanded enforcement discretion to 
make adjustments, enhanced agency accountability is another. ll9 
D. Will Greater Enforcement Discretion Lead to Biased or Inconsistent 
Enforcement or the Perception of Greater Bias in the Enforcement 
Process? 
As the discretion afforded to regulators increases, so does the poten-
tial for biased or inconsistent enforcement. There is considerable evi-
dence showing that enforcement personnel exhibit systematic biases 
when they make discretionary decisions. As Professor M. Baumgartner 
has summarized, across all sorts of regulatory contexts, legal officials are 
influenced by factors such as the moral respectability of citizens whose 
cases they deal with, the social status of the parties involved in a case, 
and how well the parties knew each other before a dispute developed (or 
crime occurred). She concludes: "[l]eft to their own devices, agents of 
the law routinely favor some sorts of people over others. Discretion, in 
practice, amounts to what is commonly known as discrimination.,,12o 
Indeed, there is substantial evidence of racial discrimination against Af-
rican Americans in the criminal justice system, including racially dispro-
portionate sentences for drug and other offenses, higher rates of institu-
tionalization and a greater likelihood of being charged with more serious 
offenses for juveniles, and other differential treatment. 121 Evidence 
likewise has shown for decades that discrimination in police practices is 
systemic and widespread, even in police departments known to be highly 
professional. 122 
Regulatory enforcement differs from enforcement in the fields of 
criminal justice and social welfare in that the targets of enforcement ac-
119. [d. at 148. 
120. M. P. Baumgartner, The Myth of Discretion. in THE USES OF DISCRETION, supra note 75, at 
157. See also Keith Hawkins. Using Legal Discretion. in THE USES OF DISCRETION. supra note 75. 
at 43 ("[I]t is clear from a large number of studies that assessments of moral character made by legal 
decision-makers are one of the most pervasive and persistent features in shaping the exercise of 
discretion.") 
121. MICHAEL K. BROWN. ET AL.. WHITEWASHING RACE 139-47 (2003). Being black. other 
things equal, doubled the chance of going to federal prison for a cocaine-related offense and added 
an average of forty months to the sentence. [d. at 144. 
122. [d. at 149. 
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tivity are typically corporations, not individuals. Thus, there may be less 
concern about bias based on personal or demographic characteristics. 
Nonetheless, the potential for bias remains. Enforcers may choose to 
respond to violations differently based on the race or social status of a 
community in which the violations occur; they may take more seriously 
the complaints of wealthier, more professional citizens; or they may act 
more or less leniently depending on the status or "moral respectability" 
of a regulated entity. 
In the environmental area, there is mixed evidence about whether 
enforcement is discriminatory. A 1992 report by the National Law Jour-
nal (NLJ) analyzing all civil judicial enforcement cases resolved by the 
EPA from 1985 to 1991 found that penalties for violations of federal en-
vironmentallaws were 46% lower in minority communities than in white 
communities ($153,067 vs. $105,028).123 It found, however, that a 
community's income level was not a reliable predictor of the size of pen-
alties. The study also found racial disparities in the EPA's response to 
contaminated waste sites. 124 Two· subsequent studies of the cases re-
viewed by the NLJ, however, have questioned the 1992 study's conclu-
sions. Professor Evan Ringquist found that the results varied depending 
on how one grouped the historical data. 125 Mark Atlas also reevaluated 
the cases analyzed by NLJ using some different methodologies and 
found no disparities in low income or minority communities. 126 But a 
123. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1. Specifically, average penalties imposed under the 
Resource Conservation & Recovery Act were 500% lower; under the Clean Water Act, 28% lower; 
under the Clean Air Act, 8% lower; under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 15% lower; and in multi-
media actions involving enforcement of several statutes, 306% lower. 
124. Id. A 1995 report found that in Virginia, facilities in communities in which more than half 
of the popUlation was African American were inspected less frequently than other facilities, and 
when violations of applicable environmental laws were found, the average length of time to bring the 
facility into compliance was longer in these communities. J. LEGIS. AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM'N 
OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMB., SOLID WASTE FACILITY MANAGEMENT IN VIRGINIA: IMPACT ON MINOR· 
ITY COMMUNITIES (VA. 1995). 
125. Professor Ringquist first confirmed the study's findings that penalties from 1985-1991 
were higher in white areas, but also found that penalties were higher in poor communities. He also 
examined civil judicial enforcement actions filed by the EPA dating back to 1974, and concluded 
that from 1974 to 1985, penalties were higher in minority and poor communities, and that during the 
entire period from 1974 to 1991, there was little difference in average fines between white and mi-
nority areas (and that penalties were higher in poor areas). Evan 1. Ringquist, A Question of Justice: 
Equity in Environmental Litigation, 1974-1991,60 1. POL. 1148, 1160-62 (1998). 
126. Mark Atlas, Rush to Judgment: An Empirical Analysis of Environmental Equity in U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement Actions, 35 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 633, 633-35 (2001). 
Specifically, Atlas used geographic concentric rings around facility locations as the units of analysis, 
rather than facility zip codes. Id. at 661-62. He also made changes based on what he determined 
were mistakes in the EPA's original enforcement database. Id. at 659. Atlas found that the income 
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more recent study of air polluting facilities in New Jersey found dispari-
ties in enforcement. 127 The study found that air emitters tended to con-
centrate in poor neighborhoods containing high minority concentrations 
and that facilities in such areas had higher rates of significant violation 
than in other areas, but lower rates of state administrative orders issued 
and lower penalty amounts. 128 
To the extent that there already are enforcement biases, granting 
agencies more discretion could exacerbate them. The back-end adjust-
ment process may further contribute to unequal enforcement outcomes 
for two reasons. First, low-income communities of color may lack the 
resources and expertise to participate in the individualized enforcement 
determinations contemplated by back-end adjustments. This point, fur-
ther developed below, is true for all members of the public impacted by 
enforcement decisions, but the lack of resources is likely to be particu-
larly acute for certain communities. The second relates to the nature of 
enforcement decisions, which are more informal and even less structured 
than informal rulemaking. The informality and open-endedness of the 
process may disadvantage minority communities relative to rulemaking 
or adjudication. Studies of unregulated and informal processes find that 
they are characterized by substantial gender and race discrimination, pos-
sibly because people with prejudices are more likely to act on their atti~ 
tudes in informal, as opposed to formal, settings. 129 
Even if a back-end adjustment process does not increase bias in en-
forcement, the notion that agencies have even more open-ended discre-
tion could lead to the perception of greater bias, especially among minor-
ity groups. Indeed, one reason why the National Law Journal study 
mentioned above had such a powerful impact when it was released is that 
it resonated with deeply-held beliefs in minority communities that laws 
are enforced unfairly against them---concerns highlighted by racial pro-
filing, bias in the administration of the death penalty, and other law en-
forcement practices. 
level of an area had no meaningful effect on penalties, and that while a community's race affected 
penalties, it was in the opposite direction of what the NU found, i.e. penalties increased as the pro-
portion of minorities in an area increased. [d. at 676--77. 
127. Jeremy Mennis, Race and the Location and Regulation of Air Polluting Facilities in New 
Jersey, (Report prepared for Camden Regional Legal Services, Aug. 3, 2003) (on file with author). 
128. [d. 
129. Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm 
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 67~9 (1998); see also Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and 
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 
1359, 1375-90 (discussing theories of prejudice and how prejudice influences conflicts and the 
settings in which conflicts are resolved). 
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A different concern about unfair enforcement is that back-end ad-
justments could result in inconsistent enforcement against regulated enti-
ties. 130 On the one hand, the essence of enhanced discretion allows regu-
lators the flexibility to depart from generally applicable rules so that 
firms in the same category can be treated differently. On the other hand, 
"[o]ne of the most desired features of any enforcement system is consis-
tency-[that] similarly situated enterprises should be treated consistently. 
Such consistency is essential to ensuring the credibility of an enforce-
ment program and widespread voluntary compliance.,,131 Indeed, one of 
the stated goals of the EPA's penalty policies is the "fair and equitable 
treatment of regulated entities.,,132 In environmental law, consistent 
treatment is particularly crucial so that regulated entities believe they are 
competing on a level playing field, given the significant investments re-
quired to meet environmental requirements. 133 
Will back-end adjustments create a perception among regulated enti-
ties of disparate treatment? If so, will this undermine the extent of vol-
untary compliance? In part, the answers to these questions will depend 
on the criteria devised for granting enforcement discretion and on 
whether regulated entities believe the adjustments are being granted in a 
principled way. At the very least, it seems likely that enforcement staff 
will face considerable pressure from regulated entities to provide them 
with the same type of adjustments granted to their competitors. 134 
130. See Cozad, supra note 84 (noting that granting additional discretion to individual agency 
staff will mean that decisions more likely will be based on individual values, beliefs and biases, and 
voicing concern that there will be less consistency, fairness, and predictability in decisions); cf 
Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TuLsA L.J. 325, 336 
(1996) ('The difference between two hypothetical Brownfields settlement agreements may depend 
as much upon the attitude of the EPA negotiator or the persuasive ability of industry officials as on 
the objective characteristics of each site. The danger, then, is that flexibility could mean 'relaxed 
standards rather than adapting compliance to circumstances. "'). 
131. Rechtschaffen, supra note 103, at 1223. An oft-quoted maxim of enforcement practice 
coined by Chester Bowles, a member of the 1941 wartime Office of Price Administration, holds that 
"20 percent of the regulated population would automatically comply with any regulation ... 5 per-
cent would attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75 percent would go along with it as long as·they 
thought the 5 percent would be caught and punished." Bardach & Kagan, supra note 74, at 65--66 
(citing CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO KEEP: My YEARS IN PuBLIC LIFE 1941-196925 (1971». 
132. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (1984), available at 
http://www.wildlaw.orglEco-Laws/civ-pen.htm. 
133. EPA attorney Cozad points out that because of the substantial resources involved in demon-
strating that a facility is entitled to a back-end adjustment, resources that smaller firms typically do 
not have, larger facilities are likely to disproportionately benefit from such an adjustment process. 
Cozad, supra note 84. 
134. See id. (observing that if an agency grants enforcement leniency to one entity in industry, 
such as exempting a cattle feed lot from Clean Water Act requirements, many other entities in indus-
try are likely to seek similar relief). 
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E. Will Greater Enforcement Discretion Create a Risk of Weakening 
Enforcement? 
While the back-end adjustment process advocated by Professors 
Shapiro and Glicksman is a nuanced and incremental one, past experi-
ence with enforcement discretion suggests that it can be quite difficult to 
keep discretion from being used to weaken enforcement, even where 
there are ostensible safeguards in place. In this regard, it is instructive to 
consider the record of state enforcement performance. 
Most federal environmental statutes operate under a "cooperative 
federalism" framework. Under this system, the federal government sets 
national standards and is ultimately responsible for ensuring achievement 
of these requirements, but states can receive authorization from the EPA 
to implement the program under EPA oversight. To obtain authorization, 
states must enact standards at least as stringent as federal law and dem-
onstrate that they have adequate personnel, enforcement authorities, and 
other capacity to administer the program. 135 States also agree, as part of 
specific authorization agreements with the EPA, to carry out specific en-
forcement activities and follow EPA enforcement guidance. States now 
administer over 75% of the major federal delegable environmental pro-
grams, and 65% of all delegable programs. 136 
In practice, many states depart significantly from the EPA's stated 
policies and expectations. For example, many states do not conduct in-
spections as often or as thoroughly as the EPA requires and fail to iden-
tify and report significant violators to the EP A. 137 In many instances, 
135. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2001); 40 C.F.R. § 123.22-.41 (2003) (describing authoriza-
tion requirements for state administration of CWA permitting program). 
136. R. Steven Brown, The States Protect the Environment, ECO STATES, Summer 1999, at 3, 
available at http://www.sss.orglecos/publicationslstatesarticle.htrn (last visited Apr. 21, 2004). 
137. A review by EPA of CAA enforcement by six states in four of EPA's regions found that 
despite performing over 3300 inspections during the period in question, the states reported only 
eighteen significant violators to the EPA. When the Inspector General audited 430 of the 3300 in-
spections, it identified an additional 103 significant violators. Other regional offices reported similar 
under reporting by the states. Hearing on the Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Federal State 
Relations, Before the S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo (1997) (statement of Nikki L. 
Tinsley, Acting Inspector Gen., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/l05th1tinsley.htm. A 2001 EPA audit of Clean Water Act enforcement found 
that in a number of states "many serious toxicity violations were not classified as 'significant' and 
thus were not subject to corrective or enforcement actions," and that "[nlumerous other major and 
minor facility violations went unreported." The report also found that the states examined needed to 
improve the quality of their inspections to ensure that facilities were accurately reporting monitoring 
data. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER ENFORCEMENT: STATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CLEAN WATER ACT DISCHARGERS CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE, Rep. No. 2001-P-
00013, at 23-24,27 (2001). 
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enforcement actions taken by the states are not "timely and appropri-
ate"--characteristics that, according to deterrence theory underlying the 
EPA's enforcement policies, are necessary to deter future violations. 
When penalties are imposed by states, according to a host of studies, they 
frequently are inconsistent with the EPA's penalty policies. Many states 
fail to recover economic benefit when assessing penalties-a core ele-
ment of deterrence theory designed to insure that companies do not gain 
from noncompliance and that there is a level playing field among regu-
lated entities.138 One study of RCRA civil penalties from 1986 to 1999, 
for example, found that in forty out of forty-two states analyzed, RCRA 
penalties imposed by states were lower than those imposed by the corre-
sponding regional EPA office and that, holding other variables constant, 
state RCRA penalties are about half the amount that the EPA would im-
pose in similar circumstances.139 (States authorized to carry out federal 
occupational safety and health programs also generally assess lower pen-
alties per violation than does the federal govemment.)I40 Finally, rates of 
noncompliance with environmental laws (the great majority of which 
occurs under the states' watch) are substantial-typically estimated to be 
in the range of twenty to forty percent. 141 
In theory, departures from the EPA's guidance by states are sup-
posed to be remedied by the EPA in its role of overseeing state programs. 
In practice, however, the EPA has had only limited success in moving 
state performance more in line with EPA expectations. 142 Studies show 
138. The 2001 Clean Water Act audit found that state "penalties [for significant violations] were 
sometimes insufficient to prevent further violations, and were not always collected." The audit 
noted that this may have contributed to a large number of recurring violations, pointing out that 
"[o]ver one-third of the states reported that over half of their major facilities with significant viola-
tions in 1999 also had recurring significant violations in fiscal 2000." OFFICE OF lNSPEITOR GEN., 
U.S. ENVfL, PROT. AGENCY, supra note 137, at 43. 
139. MARK ATLAS, SEPARATE BUT EQUAL?: AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF STATE VERSUS 
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT STRINGENCY 11, 17 (Ass'n for Pub. Pol'y Analysis & 
Mgmt. Ann. Res. Conf., Nov. 2, 2000) (copy on file with author). The "similar circumstances" 
refers to situations when EPA is enforcing RCRA in states that have not been delegated authority to 
implement RCRA in lieu of EPA, rather than when EPA is enforcing RCRA in an authorized state, 
i.e. essentially acting in an oversight capacity. 
140. FREDERICK B. SISKIND, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 20TH CENTURY OSHA ENFORCEMENT 
DATA (2002), at http://www.dol.gov/asp/medialreportslosha-dataltoc.htm. 
141. David Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor 
Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 917, 966-67 (2001); see U.S. ENVfL. PROT. 
AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, A PILoT FOR PERFORMANCE 
ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF TIlE NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE As-
SURANCE PROGRAM 1, 7, 11-12 (Feb. 2003) (finding that the rates of significant noncompliance 
with the CW A among 6,600 major facilities were approximately twenty-five percent and that these 
rates have effectively remained steady since 1994) (on file with author). 
142. See Farber, supra note 32, at 303--{)4 (1999) (noting states that have been authorized to 
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that the EPA oversight of state programs has been inconsistent and not 
particularly effective. 143 Some oversight tools, such as "overfiling" and 
withdrawing authority for poorly performing states, are so politically 
charged and resource intensive that they are scarcely used by the EPA. I44 
Moreover, "EPA has rarely if ever actually withdrawn a state's authori-
zation.,,145 
The bottom line is that state agencies have considerable leeway in 
how they enforce the federal environmental laws that they have been au-
thorized to implement. While some states have been vigorous in carry-
ing out enforcement, in many others, discretion and the lack of effective 
oversight has led to weakened enforcement. 
Although not enforcement discretion in the traditional sense, related 
concerns emerge from the Bush Administration's recent use of the litiga-
tion process to effect significant policy changes. In a number of cases 
involving federal public lands, such as the wilderness designation proc-
ess on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands, enforcement of the 
Forest Service's roadless rule in Tongass National Forest, and the ban on 
snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park, the Administration has set-
tled lawsuits filed by pro-development states or industry groups on terms 
very favorable to the challengers, reversing or weakening environmental 
protections in the process. 146 Although all of these settlements are being 
challenged on the merits, they highlight the far-reaching nature of policy 
changes that can be effected by enforcement-like discretion. 
F. Does Providing More Enforcement Discretion Undermine the 
Symbolic Importance of Enforcement? 
There is an inherent tension between flexibility and discretion and 
the rule of law. But discretion is widely accepted as a necessary accom-
modation to the effective administration of the law. Many reform pro-
posals calling for greater discretion-regulatory waivers, exceptions, or 
contractual agreements-have gained considerable acceptance because 
of the desirability of using such mechanisms to achieve more efficient or 
implement federal environmental programs often deviate openly from statutory requirements, with-
out any meaningful response from EPA). 
143. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATEIFEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 117-19, 168 (2003) (discussing the rela-
tionship between state enforcement and EPA). 
144. [d. at 339-40. 
145. [d. at 330. 
146. Tom Turner, Unsettling Development, 20 Envtl. F. 32,33-37 (Jan./Feb. 2003). 
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fairer outcomes, even though they can undermine statutory requirements 
if stretched too far. 
Is granting greater enforcement discretion different from these other 
proposals for regulatory flexibility because of the symbolic importance 
of enforcement? Should we be more reluctant to openly permit com-
promises or departures in enforcement proceedings because of the 
broader messages that this conveys to the public? The enforcement of 
legal requirements has important symbolic values. It gives voice to the 
public's desire to regulate and sanction undesirable behavior. It assures 
the public that violators do not escape punishment. 
The message imparted by enforcement actions reaffirms for the pub-
lic that environmental statutes are important and that transgressions are 
to be taken very seriously. This message is consistent with the public's 
expressed strong disapproval of noncompliance with environmental re-
quirements-. a desire evidenced by the harsh sweeping penalties for non-
compliance and the potent enforcement tools contained in all of the ma-
jor environmental statutes. The public has consistently indicated its 
strong support for vigorous environmental enforcement. Surveys show, 
for example, that the public favors "more strongly enforcing federal en-
vironmental regulations" by overwhelming margins (75% to 21% in 
2003, 77% to 20% in 2001).147 Other polls similarly find that large ma-
jorities of the public believe either that current environmental laws need 
to be toughened or that better enforcement is needed.148 
I think enforcement resonates so strongly with the public because it 
is central to ensuring the legitimacy of the law. Enforcement is per-
ceived as fundamental to the orderly working of the legal regime. Thus, 
enforcement may be different in kind from other back-end regulatory 
adjustments. I do not mean to suggest that enforcement discretion is in-
147. Gallup Organization, March 3-5, 2003, Q9, available in LEXIS, News & Business Library, 
Public Opinion Online File, Accession No. 0428056 (polling 1,003 adults nationwide); Gallup Or-
ganization, March 5-7, 2001, Q 19, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Public Opinion Online File, 
Accession No. 0380807 (polling 1,000 adults nationwide). 
148. A 200 I survey, for example, found that 81 % of the public believes either that our environ-
ment laws are not strong enough and tougher laws should be enacted (25%) or that current laws are 
tough enough but they are not enforced, and that they should be strictly enforced (56%). Tarrance 
Group & Greenberg Quinlan Research, Inc., LeV Education Fund: Frequency Questionnaire, No-
vember 12-19. 2000, Q 27, at http://www.greenbergresearch.com/publicationslreportsl 
fq1crefpo1l11120.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) (polling 1200 registered voters). By contrast, 16% 
believe either that current laws and enforcement are fine (13 %) or laws and enforcement are too 
strict and should be relaxed (3%). 1d. Very similar results were found in a poll four years earlier. 
Belden and Russonello, The Ecology, Feb. 29-March 12, 1996, Q 37, LEXIS, News & Business 
Library, Public Opinion Online File, Accession No. 0286490 (polling 2,005 adults). 
1362 KANSAS LAW REvIEW [Vol. 52 
appropriate; to the contrary, eliminating enforcement discretion would be 
unworkable and unwise. But careful thought should be given to whether 
greater reliance on enforcement discretion in order to achieve back-end 
adjustment risks undermining the important expressive values that the 
public attaches to environmental enforcement. 
G. Summary 
As outlined in the previous sections, providing regulators with addi-
tional enforcement discretion to fine tune regulation raises a number of 
potential concerns, including placing possibly unrealistic burdens on en-
forcement staff, diminishing the public's role in setting environmental 
policy, contributing to special interest domination, increasing bias or in-
consistency in enforcement (or at least the perception of bias), weaken-
ing enforcement outright, and undermining the symbolic importance of 
enforcement. Professors Shapiro and Glicksman anticipate most of these 
types of concerns and suggest that they can be ameliorated through effec-
tive judicial review of agency enforcement discretion and increased pub-
lic participation in these discretionary decisions. The next section dis-
cusses some of the substantial challenges in implementing these 
strategies in the area of enforcement discretion. 
IV. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PuBLIC PARTICIPATION 
What role can judicial review and public participation play in ad-
dressing the pitfalls outlined above and in guarding against possible 
abuse resulting from increased enforcement discretion? This section ad-
dresses these two issues in turn. 
A. Can We Devise an Effective System of Judicial Review? 
Can decisions to refrain from enforcement-the type of enforcement 
discretion contemplated by the book's back-end adjustments-be over-
seen effectively by the courts? What process will be used, and what 
standards will be provided? Can we effectively separate enforcement 
decisions based on agency allocation of resources and setting of priori-
ties, matters which courts are unlikely to review, from decisions not to 
enforce based on policy determinations? Devising judicially reviewable 
rules guiding the exercise of enforcement discretion is possible, but it 
would be a challenging undertaking. 
The starting point in this discussion is the Supreme Court's decision 
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in Heckler v. Chaney.149 In Heckler, state prisoners who had been sen-
tenced to die by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA), arguing that the drugs being used by the states were not 
approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act. ISO They requested that the FDA investigate 
these alleged violations and take enforcement action against the states. 151 
When the FDA refused, the prisoners filed suit to compel the agency to 
take enforcement action. 152 
The Supreme Court ruled that the FDA's decision not to take en-
forcement action was not subject to judicial review under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) because it qualified as an action "committed 
to agency discretion by law" under section 701(a)(2).153 The Court ex-
plained that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce is a decision 
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion. 154 The Court 
cited several reasons for this: 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated bal-
ancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. 
Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, 
but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or an-
other, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the par-
ticular enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall poli-
cies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to 
undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against 
each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The 
agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many 
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. 155 
The Court left open the possibility that Congress could override the pre-
sumption against non-reviewability by "provid[ing] guidelines for the 
agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers ... or by other-
wise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or 
cases it will pursue.,,156 It also suggested that review of agency inaction 
might be possible where the agency's nonenforcement decision was un-
149. 470 u.s. 821 (1985). 
150. Id.at823-24. 
151. Id. at 824. 
152. Id. at 825. 
153. Id. at 837-38. 
154. Id. at 830. 
155. Id. at 831-32. 
156. Id. at 832-33. 
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constitutional, was "based solely on the [agency's] belief that it lacks 
jurisdiction," or where "the agency has 'consciously and expressly 
adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication 
of its statutory responsibilities.,,157 In a similar vein to Heckler, the Su-
preme Court recently made clear that an agency's failure to comply with 
a general statutory directive is not judicially reviewable. Specifically, the 
Court found that a challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's failure 
to take action to protect public lands from off-road vehicle damage was 
not reviewable under a statutory mandate to manage wilderness study 
areas "so as not to impair their suitability" for preservation as wilder-
ness. 158 
Since Heckler, a number of courts have relied on its exceptions 
(and expanded them) to limit Heckler's reach.159 Courts have, for in-
stance, found reviewable an agency's failure to take enforcement action 
based on an allegedly erroneous statutory interpretation or other legal 
conclusion, although not uniformly SO.160 Courts also have established 
that agency regulations, as well as statutory language, can provide a suf-
ficient standard for meaningful review. 161 Numerous cases have found 
157. Jd. at 833 n.4 (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (1973) (en banc». 
158. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004). 
159. See Bhagwat, supra note 55, at 157, 163-64; Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreview-
ability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 776-77 (1990). 
160. See, e.g., Friends of the Cowlitz v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, No. 99-70373,2001 
U.S. App. LEXIS 28368, at 14,26 n.l5 (9th Cir. June 14, 2001) (stating a court can review an 
agency's summary dismissal of a complaint based on the agency's legal conclusion that agreement 
between licensee and state wildlife agency was private agreement that couldn't be enforced, but 
lacked jurisdiction to review FERC's decision not to take enforcement action or initiate investigation 
in a suit by citizens based on FERC's failure to take action in response to complaint against licensee 
based on operations ofhydrolectric project); Edison Elec. Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 996 F.2d 326, 
333 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding a challenge to an EPA enforcement policy indicating that it would 
give relatively low priority for RCRA storage prohibition against generators of mixed waste); Int'l 
Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (challenge to the Department of Labor's interpretations that activities at issue are not 
unlawful, one basis of nonenforcement decision, is reviewable). But see Crowley Caribbean 
Transp., Inc. v. Peiia, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (challenge to Maritime Administrator's 
interpretation that carrier did not need waiver to operate foreign-flagged vessels was unreviewable 
because it was a decision to forego enforcement in one particular instance, not general enforcement 
policy). 
161. The D.C. Circuit has held, for instance, that "[j]ust as Congress can provide the basis for 
judicial review of nonenforcement decisions by spelling out statutory factors to be measured by the 
courts, so an agency can provide such factors by regulation. When an agency chooses to so fetter its 
discretion, the presumption against reviewability recognized in Chaney must give way." Center for 
Auto Safety v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Mass. Pub. Interest Re-
search Group v. NRC, 852 F.2d 9, 16 (Ist Cir. 1988). See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 17.7, at 1275 (4th ed. 2002) (providing examples of when an agency rule can pro-
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such sufficient standards to rebut the Heckler Court's presumption of 
non-reviewability. 162 
On the other hand, where statutory or regulatory language is even 
arguably ambiguous or does not sufficiently constrain decision-makers 
from considering factors other than those enumerated, courts have found 
nonenforcement to be unreviewable. For example, section 309(a) of the 
Clean Water Act appears to require EPA to take enforcement action to 
remedy statutory violations. 163 The majority of courts, however, have 
found this duty to be discretionary and unreviewable. l64 The courts have 
vide "law to apply"). 
162. Bhagwat, supra note 55, at 163-64. See, e.g., Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778, 782 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (upholding a union challenge to the Secretary of Labor after he declined to file a suit to set 
aside a union election and holding that the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
C'LMRDA") imposes a mandatory duty of enforcement if probable cause exists to believe a violation 
has occurred); Cardoza v. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1542, 1550 (7th Cir. 
1985) (court found reviewable a challenge to the Commodities Futures Trading Commission's 
("CFTC") failure to review a disciplinary action imposed by the Board of Trade of the City of Chi-
cago; while statute left the issue of when to review a disciplinary action undertaken by a member 
exchange to the judgment of the agency, the agency had furnished sufficient standards with which to 
review the agency's decision by adoption of regulation guiding its consideration of such chal-
lenges); New York Public Interest Research Group v. Whitman,321 F.3d 316, 324 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(court found reviewable EPA decision not to object to draft Clean Air Act permits issued by New 
York after EPA determined that the permits were deficient, under statutory provision that if a permit 
contains provisions that are determined by the EPA as not in compliance with the law, the EPA shall 
object to the permit); see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EnvtI. Prot. Agency, 980 F.2d 765, 767-68 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (invalidating a regulation that allowed EPA to refuse to initiate withdrawal pro-
ceedings once it has made the determination that the state no longer satisfies conditions for state 
primacy as inconsistent with Safe Drinking Water Act, which imposes a mandatory duty on EPA to 
act if requirements for primacy are not met). Although it did not involve review of an agency en-
forcement decision, Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610,614 (D.C. Cir. 1995), is also instructive. There, 
the D.C. Circuit found sufficient standards to review the Food and Drug Administration's regula-
tions defining "substantial compliance" under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act's voluntary 
industry guidelines. The Act defined substantial compliance with reference to the number, size, and 
market shares of noncomplying retailers, and provided that substantial compliance was not met if a 
"significant number of retailers failed to comply." 
163. This section provides that "whenever, on the basis of any infonnation available to [itl," 
EPA finds that a state-issued NPDES permit is violated, EPA either "shall" issue an administrative 
compliance order or bring a civil enforcement action against the violator, or "shall" issue a notice of 
violation to the state and the violator. If the Agency chooses the second option, and the state has not 
initiated enforcement action within thirty days, EPA "shall" issue an administrative compliance 
order or commence civil enforcement. 33 V.S.c. § 1319(a)(l) (2001). In the event of any other 
relevant violation of the Act, the EPA "shall" issue a compliance order or bring a civil enforcement 
action. [d. § 1319(a)(3). 
164. E.g., Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Dubois v. Thomas, 820 
F.2d 943, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Train 557 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1977). But see 
S.c. Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. ll8, 134 (D.S.C. 1978) (stating that § 309(a)(3) 
imposes a nondiscretionary duty"); Save the Valley, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 
985 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (holding that EPA had mandatory duty under § 309(a)(2) to initiate proceed-
ings to withdraw authority from Indiana to enforce the Clean Water Act once it finds that violations 
of permit conditions or limitations are so widespread that they appear to result from failure of the 
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noted (1) that one of the enforcement options provided in section 
309(a)(3) is to "bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b),,,'65 
(2) that subsection (b), in tum, only authorizes, rather than requires, EPA 
to bring suit,'66 and (3) that the use of the language of authorization re-
veals a congressional intent to give the EPA discretion to bring enforce-
ment actions, rather than mandating such actions. '67 Likewise, in Center 
for Auto Safety v. Dole,'68 the court held that the denial by the National 
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) of a citizen's 
petition to reopen an enforcement investigation against an automobile 
manufacturer for alleged safety-related defects in its product was not 
subject to judicial review. '69 The regulations at issue required an official 
evaluating a citizen petition to conduct a technical review, and, if she or 
he found a "reasonable possibility" that a safety-related defect exists, to 
grant the petition. l7o The court stated that the "reasonable possibility" 
standard did not rule out agency consideration of non-safety related fac-
tors, such as the availability and allocation of resources. 171 
Thus, Congress or agencies could, in theory, develop policies, by 
statute or regulation, that articulate when enforcement leniency is appro-
priate in order to overcome the Heckler presumption against judicial re-
view of enforcement discretion. 
Assuming that such standards are developed, the other elements of a 
judicial review process could be more easily devised. To facilitate public 
and judicial review, agencies could be required to provide advance writ-
ten notice and a statement of reasons whenever they make a back-end 
state to enforce permit conditions). 
165. 33 U.S.c. § 1319(a)(3) (2001). 
166. It provides that EPA "is authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate relief ... for 
any violation for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of this 
section." [d. § 1319(b). 
167. Whitman, 268 F.3d at 904; Dubois, 820 F.2d, at 949-50. In City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 
F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit likewise refused to find that analogous language in the 
Clean Air Act created a mandatory duty for EPA to act. [d. at 1374. The court was interpreting 
§ 113(a)(I), which provides that "[w]henever, on the basis of any information available to the Ad-
ministrator, the Administrator fmds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applica-
ble implementation plan or permit, the Administrator shall notify the person and the State in which 
the plan applies of such finding[,]" and subsection (a)(2) which provides that "[w]henever, on the 
basis of information available to him, the Administrator finds that violations of an applicable imple-
mentation plan ... are so widespread that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State 
in which the plan or permit applies to enforce the plan or permit effectively, [he] shall so notify the 
State." 42 U.S.c. § 7413(a)(1), (2) (2001). 
168. 846 F.2d 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 
169. [d. at 1535. 
170. [d. at 1534. 
171. [d. at 1535. 
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adjustment based on these policies.172 In any judicial challenge to such a 
decision, the court would evaluate whether the agency acted properly 
based on the articulated criteria. 173 The standard of review presumably 
would be the traditional one under the AP A for informal agency action, 
which is a deferential one. 174 
A separate issue is the substantive criteria that should govern the ex-
ercise of enforcement discretion. Defining these criteria is hugely impor-
tant. Disputes and ambiguity over which projects should qualify for in-
clusion in EPA's Project XL, for example, have consumed much energy 
since the project's inception. 175 On the other hand, it is clearly not possi-
ble to specifically define all or even most of the circumstances in which 
fine-tuning is appropriate; if it were, then these could be set out in an 
initial statute or regulation without the need for later adjustment. Al-
though it is beyond the scope of this article to fully examine what the 
substantive criteria should be, the questions below are some of those that 
should be considered and that hint at the complexity of the task. 176 
What countervailing benefits are necessary to justify adjustments: 
emission reductions that offset any permit exceedances; the installation 
of environmentally beneficial new technology not possible by complying 
with existing requirements; an alternative approach that is more cost ef-
fective; or other benefits? 
172. See Breger, supra note 32, at 349 (describing waiver provision in the 1996 revisions to the 
Rorida Administrative Procedure Act which requires that an agency decision on a waiver petition 
include a statement of facts and reasons). 
173. See Bhagwat, supra note 55, at 182-85. In Professor Bhagwat's formulation, the remedy 
for improper agency decisions would be a remand to agencies to take a second look, rather than to 
actually order agency action, which Professor Bhagwat suggests would raise potential separation of 
powers issues, and could interfere with agency decisions about allocation of its resources. See also 
Seidenfeld, supra note 75, at 491 (discussing benefits of "process" review of exercises of agency 
discretion, noting that as currently practiced, "process" review evaluates the reasons the agency 
gives for its action as an indirect means of ferreting out non-deliberative decisions). 
174. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2001); see SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note I, at 174 (advocating that 
standards for back-end adjustments should be deferential towards the agency); Breger, supra note 
32, at 347 (,The notion of increasing regulatory flexibility by empowering agency officials with 
added discretion requires, of necessity, significant judicial deference to agency exercise of that dis-
cretion. There is no point in fostering administrative discretion if that discretion is checked by a 
heightened level of judicial review. "). 
175. See Steinzor, supra note 98, at 125-26. 
176. See generally Arnan, supra note 73, at 280 (suggesting typology of reasons for which agen-
cies grant exceptions to rules of general applicability, including hardship, fairness and policy excep-
tions); Robert Glicksman & Sidney Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjust-
ment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004) (noting categories for which Congress permits back-end 
adjustments in health, safety and environmental law, including lack of adverse impact on the envi-
ronment, hardship or technological unavailability, fairness, and conflicts between environmental and 
other social policy values). 
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Should adjustments be authorized for good faith compliance efforts? 
For regulations that are especially complex and recently adopted? For 
firms whose individual compliance costs are grossly disproportionate to 
those of other regulated firms in the relevant category? In cases where 
compliance with a rule will produce relatively little environmental bene-
fit because of the location of a firm? 
Should there be an absolute floor limiting enforcement discretion 
such that adjustments are not permitted for more than a certain number of 
violations, or for violations more than a certain percentage above the 
permitted level, or for violations that result in more than a given risk 
level to the public, or for violations occurring in communities already 
burdened by a ~isproportionate share of polluting facilities? 
Should discretion be reserved only for entities with superior compli-
ance records? With superior records only at a given facility in question 
or at all of the facilities operated by a firm? 
The standards also would have to identify the categories of decisions 
that are not subject to judicial review. These should include decisions 
based on resource constraints, conflicting agency priorities, an assess-
ment of the likelihood of success on the merits of a case, the choice of 
alternative enforcement methods used to achieve compliance, and so 
forth. 177 As Heckler and other cases indicate, courts are extremely wary 
about second-guessing enforcement decisions based on these criteria. 
The Ninth Circuit, for example, in rejecting the argument that the CW A 
imposes a mandatory enforcement duty on the EPA, explained that "[t]he 
EPA has many plants to monitor and must be able to choose which viola-
tions are the most egregious. It would be unwise for the judiciary, gen-
erally untrained in biology or chemistry and uninformed about the level 
of violations at other water treatment plants, to attempt to set the priori-
ties for the EPA's enforcement efforts.,,178 Other decisions reflect a simi-
177. According to Professor Bhagwat, this would "balanc[e] the need for agency autonomy in 
administrative matters with the need for judicial supervision of policymaking and rulemaking." 
Bhagwat, supra note 55, at 183. He argues that in hybrid justification cases, the reviewing court 
must separate out the different components of the agency's reasoning in selecting the standard of 
review. See id. at 183-84. 
178. Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Dubois v. Thomas, 
820 F.2d 943, 947-48 (in dismissing the argument that section 309(a) "imposes a mandatory duty 
[on EPA] to investigate and make findings as to alleged violations," the court explains that "EPA 
could be compelled to expend its limited resources investigating multitudinous complaints, irrespec-
tive of the magnitude of their environmental significance. As a result, EPA would be unable to 
investigate efficiently and effectively those complaints that EPA, in its expertise, considers to be the 
most egregious violations of the FWPCA. Only if the Administrator has discretion to allocate its 
own resources can a rational enforcement approach be achieved."); City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 
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lar desire to avoid interfering with agency prioritization and resource 
allocation choices. 
But what if a decision is based in part on resource/case assessment 
grounds and in part on the back-end adjustment rules? For instance, 
suppose an agency decides not to inspect or prosecute violations it un-
covers against a category of industrial stormwater discharges. Suppose 
that it made this decision in part because it is stretched thin for staff (a 
justification entrusted to agency discretion) and, in part, because most of 
the dischargers are small businesses (a justification based on the adjust-
ment policy). Suppose, however, that enforcement leniency is inconsis-
tent with the adjustment policy because several of the exempted facilities 
are recidivists and because a few are located near fishing piers and thus 
could expose individuals to pollutants above the safety threshold permit-
ted under the adjustment policy. Can a court meaningfully review such a 
decision? How will it separate the weight accorded to factors that are 
reviewable and factors that are unreviewable? Will it be overly deferen-
tial out of fear of interfering with agency enforcement prerogatives? 
Conversely, will the articulation of some criteria for exercising en-
forcement discretion empower courts to intrude on decisions traditionally 
entrusted entirely to agency discretion? Under the guise of searching to 
see if an agency was pretextually relying on unreviewable criteria in for-
going enforcement, will courts end up second-guessing agencies about 
resource or case evaluation issues? 
As the above discussion indicates, there is an inherent tension be-
tween, on the one hand, maintaining sufficient flexibility to allow regula-
tors to make back-end adjustments, including adjustments based on new 
information and unexpected circumstances, and, on the other hand, facili-
tating judicial review by anticipating in advance all the types of adjust-
ments that might be made and the standards by which regulators should 
make them. Balancing these considerations is a task that can be accom-
plished, but it will require considerable skill and thought to do so. 
F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1981) (in refusing to find that analogous language in the Clean Air Act 
created a mandatory duty for the EPA to act, the court explains that U[tlhe branches of government 
charged with the investigation of violations of the law and with enforcement of the law have tradi-
tionally been afforded broad discretion in carrying out these duties. . .. One of the principal bases 
for the doctrine is judicial recognition that enforcement agencies have only limited resources at their 
command. The enforcement agencies are duty-bound to allocate those resources in the interest of 
the general public as they perceive it, not in the causes deemed most important by individual citi-
zens.") 
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B. Will Increased Public Participation Opportunities Address the 
Potential Pitfalls of Increased Enforcement Discretion? 
Professors Shapiro and Glicksman condition their support of back-
end adjustments on the premise that the opportunities for participation 
afforded interested persons are equivalent to those that govern adoption 
in the first place. 179 While such opportunities may be more readily avail-
able with respect to other mechanisms identified for achieving back-end 
adjustments-such as waivers, deadline extensions, etc.-it would be 
considerably more difficult to fashion such a public role in enforcement 
decisions, especially if that role is to be comparable to the public's role 
in the rulemaking process. There are a number of reasons for this. 
As noted above, there are innumerable discretionary decision points 
that can determine whether and how enforcement action is taken. It is 
not practicable, however, to afford the public routine opportunities to 
comment on all of these decisions-i.e. which facilities should be subject 
to inspection, what level of penalties should be assessed, and so forth. In 
some cases, the critical dialogue between the regulator and regulated will 
occur not in a formal setting but in a facility during the course of an in-
spection, such as when an inspector discusses observed violations with 
an environmental manager. This informal consultation/bargaining can be 
decisive in determining an agency's enforcement response. 180 But it is 
not realistic for the public to accompany enforcement personnel on rou-
tine inspections because interested environmental groups lack the re-
sources to do this, regulators might complain that the public's presence 
could interfere with their duties, and regulated entities usually are very 
resistant to allowing this type of access to the public. Could the public 
be afforded a role in formal negotiations between agencies and regulated 
entities? That, at least, seems workable, although it could delay en-
forcement actions and make them more costly. Also, there would have 
to be some means for an agency to identify ex ante the cases in which it 
is considering invoking its added back-end authority and invite the public 
to participate. 
Perhaps what Shapiro and Glicksman have in mind is simply to pro-
vide advance notice of a proposed back-end adjustment and the opportu-
nity for public comment. This would be comparable to notice and com-
179. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, at 175. 
180. See HAWKINS, supra note 86, at 110-54 (noting reliance of inspectors on system of infor-
mal negotiation and persuasion). 
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ment rules for proposed regulations, as well as some existing require-
ments in the enforcement process. The Clean Water Act, for example, 
provides for public notice and comment on proposed administrative pen-
alties, 181 and most environmental statutes require advance public notice 
of proposed settlements entered into by the federal government. 182 But 
this does not seem truly equivalent to the participatory rights afforded at 
the initial rulemaking stage. In the adjustment context, the decision has 
already been made, there is less opportunity to explore the agency's deci-
sion-making process, and much less of an opportunity to research the 
relevant issues and develop a record. A typical rulemaking process takes 
years and entails all sorts of informal meetings and conversations among 
the interested parties, while the adjustment process presumably would be 
done relatively expeditiously. Professor David Dana has made a similar 
point in discussing the role of the public in environmental contractarian 
regulation (in which an agency and a regulated entity negotiate facility 
specific requirements). He notes that since such regulation results from 
bilateral negotiations between regulated entities and the government, en-
vironmental groups are at best relegated to reacting to (rather than par-
ticipating in the principal development of) site-specific plans. 183 
Moreover, on a practical level, back-end enforcement adjustments 
have the potential to diminish the public's role in setting policy because 
the costs of monitoring them are high. Unlike standard setting or rule-
making, enforcement actions are numerous and decentralized. As a gen-
eral matter, the incentives for participating in the enforcement process 
are sharply skewed in favor of regulated interests and against the pub-
lic. l84 While regulated entities are highly motivated to participate be-
cause of the high costs they may face from an enforcement action, public 
interest groups typically realize only minor gains from any individual 
action since each typically is limited to an individual site or facility, is 
181. 33 U.S.c. § 1319(g)(4)(A) (2003). 
182. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 74I3(g) (2003) (providing that a consent order or settlement agree-
ment under CAA requires at least thirty days notice in Federal Register). No court hearing is re-
quired. 
183. David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 20oo 
U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 52-53. 
[d. 
It may well be more difficult for environmentalists and environmentally oriented citizens 
to influence the formation of contractarian environmental regulation than it is for them to 
influence the formation of command-and-control environmental regulation. As a result, 
the content of contractarian regulation may be more in tune with the cost-saving agenda 
of regulated entities than with the agenda of environmentalists. 
184. Zinn, supra note 85, at 128-29. 
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low-visibility, and is unlikely to generate significant publicity. As Pro-
fessor Mark Seidenfeld has observed in the context of other back-end 
adjustment approaches, participation by public interest groups is there-
fore likely to be limited because it "does not promise notoriety that na-
tional group leaders can parlay into increased membership. Nor does 
such participation generate revenues for a participating groUp.,,185 At the 
same time, he notes, local environmental advocates often lack both the 
time to commit to the endeavor and the expertise needed to participate 
meaningfully in the process. 186 This disparity in participation incentives 
will remain true to a considerable extent even if there is only a limited 
universe of enforcement adjustment cases for environmental groups to 
monitor because there are asymmetric stakes in any individual enforce-
ment decision. The bottom line is that for environmental and public in-
terest groups constrained by limited resources, participating in the en-
forcement process is likely to be cost-ineffective as compared to 
involvement at the regulatory or legislative level.187 
Scholars have noted these difficulties in the context of other flexible 
regulatory mechanisms, including Project XL and other environmental 
contractarian regimes and negotiated rulemaking. While not precisely 
comparable to back-end enforcement discretion, they share a basic simi-
larity: both adjust generally applicable regulatory standards to achieve a 
superior result based on an individual facility's circumstances. Professor 
Steinzor, for example, notes that the lack of technical assistance usually 
precludes meaningful community involvement in the XL process "in the 
debate over the highly technical issues involved in determining which 
regulatory exemptions to grant, evaluating what environmental benefits 
will be achieved, and predicting what adverse effects might be condoned 
in the project. Without adequate technical support, most local commu-
nity representatives have great difficulty evaluating the long-term impli-
cations of a proposal .... ,,188 Professor Brad Mank similarly has con-
tended that "[m]ost members of the general public and most 
environmental groups are not equipped to evaluate the complex issues 
185. Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for 
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411,474 (2000) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Empowering 
Stakeholders]. 
186. [d. at 474-77. 
187. Zinn, supra note 85, at 129-30; see Dana, supra note 183, at 52-53 (noting much greater 
resource demands on environmental groups in having to participate in multiple, decentralized proc-
esses rather than centralized lawmaking or rule making actions). 
188. Rena I. Steinwr, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any 
Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10527, 10534 (1996). 
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raised by many XL projects.,,189 Both Steinzor and Mank call for mate-
rial assistance to help promote community involvement--either by com-
pensating participants directly for their time or by providing technical 
assistance to citizens who wish to participate in XL projects or challenge 
site-specific exceptions to national regulations. 19o EPA attorney Dave 
Cozad voiced similar worries in his presentation at this symposium. He 
pointed out that there tends to be very little participation by the public or 
environmental groups when the EPA grants variances or other regulatory 
. 191 exceptIOns. 
One response to this argument is that public interest groups regularly 
participate in the environmental enforcement process through citizen 
suits, which have steadily grown over the past twenty-five years. 192 But 
citizen suits differ in at least three important respects from back-end ad-
justments. One, most citizen suits are relatively simple and inexpensive 
to prosecute. Citizens usually can base their actions on a company's 
permit violations, without having to litigate issues of environmental harm 
and the cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory mechanisms. Two, 
citizen suits can generate significant publicity and, sometimes, important 
legal precedent. 193 Three, there are significant potential rewards for 
bringing citizen. suits. Citizen groups frequently negotiate settlements 
that result in defendants spending money on environmentally beneficial 
projects in lieu of some portion of civil penalties. Likewise, plaintiffs 
may be able to obtain attorneys fees if they prevail. Thus, in most in-
189. Bradley Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory 
Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization. 25 EcoL. L.Q. I, 60 (1998); see id. at 
60--61 (noting high transaction costs for local groups in terms of organizing, raising money, and 
educating decisionmakers in individualized or local proceedings, and that "[I]ocal community groups 
may not have' the time or resources to participate effectively in complex negotiations to develop 
alternative compliance strategies"); see also Siedenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders, supra note 185, 
at 479 ("Even if representatives of local groups happen to have the time to invest in regular monitor-
ing and fine-tuning of [XL agreements]. they almost invariably do not have the expertise to collect 
their own data on the facility's performance or even to review company data critically."). 
190. See Steinzor, supra note 98, at 145 (arguing that private citizens should receive compensa-
tion for participating in site specific XL negotiations. "Without it, public interest representation in 
site-specific negotiations will be possible only in isolated and rare circumstances, and even then, 
only for those citizens who face no economic barriers to participation"); see also Bradford C. Mank. 
What Comes After Technology: Using an "Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regula-
tion of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263,340-43 (1994) (arguing that the gov-
ernment should be required to provide technical assistance to citizens who wish to challenge requests 
by industry for site-specific exceptions to national regulations). 
191. See Cozad, supra note 84. 
192. James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 ENVTI... L. 
REP. 10704, 10704 (2003). 
193. See id. at 10705-06 (noting that "[t]hree out of every four judicial opinions stemming from 
the nation's principal environmental enforcement laws involves, at its core, a citizen suit."). 
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stances, citizen enforcement cases are less resource intensive and more 
attractive than participation in the back-end adjustment process. 
At the same time, and perhaps of greater import, a back-end adjust-
ment process likely would undermine the role of private enforcement of 
regulatory requirements-a means by which citizens shape policy both 
through their direct enforcement and the pressure that sixty-day notices 
of intent to sue exert on regulators. This is because for fine-tuning of 
regulatory policy to work through discretionary enforcement decisions, 
these decisions would have to be given conclusive effect barring citizen 
suits. Otherwise, a regulated entity would remain subject to citizen suits 
seeking to enforce standards "on the books"-rather than those decided 
through a back-end process-because most citizen suit provisions only 
bar private enforcement actions if the government is diligently prosecut-
ing an alleged violation (or under the CW A, if an agency has issued a 
final administrative order assessing a penalty).194 
Thus, the theoretical benefits of providing greater public participa-
tion will not be realized if real world incentives keep community and 
environmental groups from participating in the back-end adjustment 
process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article is not intended to be a broadside against the use of dis-
cretion in the enforcement process. To the contrary, I believe that discre-
tion in enforcement is not only inevitable but also desirable and that ef-
forts to foreclose enforcement discretion-either by mandating 
forgiveness or mandating sanctions for certain types of violations-
generally are undesirable. As I have also argued above, there already is 
enormous discretion in the enforcement process, and it currently is used 
to effectuate back-end adjustments, although not formally characterized 
as such. 
But formalizing and expanding the use of enforcement discretion to 
make back-end adjustments is an idea that should be approached very 
cautiously. Such an adjustment process raises a number of concerns 
194. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(B) (2003) (barring citizen suits under CWA if agency is 
diligently prosecuting an action to require compliance); id. at § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii) (barring citizen 
suits under CW A if final administrative order issued and violator has paid the penalty). See Brad-
ford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Refonn 
Initiatives: The Needfor Legislative Authorization, 25 EcOL. L. Q. 1,27-29 (1998) (noting that it is 
unlikely that an agreement between EPA and a regulated entity not to take enforcement action for 
actions that violate statutory requirements would bar a citizen suit). 
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about imposing unrealistic additional burdens on enforcement staff, de-
creasing public involvement in policy setting, allowing greater special 
interest domination in the regulatory process, and increasing bias or in-
consistency in enforcement (or the perception that such is occurring). 
While incorporating provisions for judicial review and public participa-
tion into the back-end adjustment scheme in theory can address some of 
these concerns, there are serious questions about how effective they 
would be in practice and, in particular, how often community groups and 
public interest organizations would take advantage of these opportuni-
ties. Experimenting with enforcement discretion on a small scale may 
prove these worries to be unfounded, but as Professors Shapiro and 
Glicksman argue elsewhere, "before displacing [the traditional approach] 
on a much larger scale, the proponents of such a change should bear the 
burden of demonstrating that practical experience with [additional en-
forcement discretion] justifies such a shift.,,195 
195. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note I, at 154. 
